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I. INTRODUCTION  
A. BACKGROUND 
 
At the dawn of the 1990s, the world witnessed momentous changes.  Africa was 
not immune to these dramatic shifts in the economic and political order.1  The end of the 
Cold War had a major impact on the continent of Africa, including a significant increase 
in peacekeeping interventions.  What made these military interventions special was that 
they were carried out by African states, under the auspices of sub-regional organizations.  
This marked a departure from traditional military interventions in Africa, which had been 
conducted by foreign powers with ties to the African state in question.  Since the end of 
the Cold War, major Western powers are increasingly reluctant to become embroiled in 
military intervention beyond the confines of their geographical and national interest.2  
This anti-intervention mood has even led major powers, especially the United States, to 
discourage action at the global level, because it feared being later called upon to reinforce 
United Nations (UN) operations.3  Thus, recent interventions by African countries have 
necessitated international withdrawal. 
This new type of sub-regional peacemaking intervention presents a number of 
challenges, not least of which is the apparent violation of the international legal principle 
of non-interference in the affairs of sovereign states.  This principle is a prominent 
feature in the charter of the Organization of African Unity (OAU).4 
On a more practical level, these interventions have been conducted by sub-
regional organizations whose mandates, until recently, were limited to promoting 
                                                 
1 Edmond Keller, “Introduction: Toward a New African Political Order” in Edmond J. Keller and 
Donald Rothchild, Africa in the New International Order: Rethinking State Sovereignty (Colorado, Lynne 
Rienner Publishers, 1996), p 1 
2 Anton du Plessis, “Military Intervention: Nature and Scope” in Leone du Plessis and Michael Hough, 
Managing African Conflicts: The Challenge of Military Intervention (HSRC Publishers: Pretoria, South 
Africa, 2000), p 19  
3 Falk, R., “Post-Cold War Illusions and Daunting Realities” in Williamson, R (ed) Some Corner of a 
Foreign Fields: Intervention and World Order (Houdmills, 1998), p 144 
4 OAU has been recently replaced by the new formation of the African Union that was launched in 
2002.  This new organization deals differently with the issue of non-interference vis-à-vis OUA. 
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regional economic cooperation and integration.  These organizations are themselves 
weak, lacking in peacemaking experience and financial resources.  This weakness is 
reflected in the absence of structures that specifically deal with intrastate conflict, not an 
issue of concern to these organizations.  Mainly, the available structures were built 
around the possibility of a state to state conflict.  
The proliferation of conflicts within the domestic realms of the member states in 
some sub-regions has increased at a fast rate and thus can no longer be avoided by all 
those concerned within those sub-regions.  These kinds of conflicts, particularly in 
Africa, have a tendency to affect domestic relations of other states within the sub-region.  
This cascading effect ultimately may lead to disruption and dislocation of all states and 
people’s relations within the sub-region. 
Initiatives to deal with this type of carnage required all the member states to 
recognize that civil war in one state means trouble for other states in the sub-region thus 
to contemplate of conducting a peacemaking mechanism dedicated to ending such 
conflicts.  However, this kind of mission needs a substantial contribution of resources 
from the member states themselves rather than from the external actors, who are not 
directly impacted by the conflicts.  Nevertheless, there is a mood of introspection in 
Africa today and a growing resolve to find effective African solutions to African 
problems, including achieving peace and stability through conflict resolution.   
Recognizing that sub-regional solutions must be found in the absence of 
international engagement extends beyond the peacekeeper to the potentially peacekept.  
In two of the three cases to be examined in this thesis, namely Liberia and the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), the initial requests for assistance were 
directed to historical patrons and/or the international community.  Both requests were 
followed by demurrals, first by the US declaring that its interest at that moment was 
focused on the Persian Gulf region.  This declaration was confirmed when the US, even 
though it had about 2000 Marines stationed off the coast of Liberia, refused to move in 
and separate the warring factions. Second, from the international perspective, the then 
UN Secretary General, Javier Perez de Cuellar, categorically stated that the UN would 
not intervene.  “Meanwhile, as the world looked on and passed the buck more and more 
2 
Liberians were dying and starving.”5  The international community showed little interest 
in resolving the conflict in Liberia.   
The refusal of these requests sent a clear signal that international patrons could no 
longer be called upon to rescue of their African clients and that the international 
community lacked the ability, if not the will, to respond in the absence of major power 
support.  African leaders, historically reluctant to call upon neighbors for assistance, 
feared that such interventions would be driven by the interests of the interveners.   
Additionally, the avoidance of seeking assistance from neighboring countries may be 
attributed to the knowledge that they do not have any significant resources required to 
make effective contribution.  This lack of resources could ultimately lead to neighboring 
countries refusing point blank to offer assistance.    
However, lacking viable alternatives, the leaders of Lesotho, Democratic 
Republic of Congo and Liberia (the conflict-prone countries) each requested assistance 
from its sub-regional organization.  Interestingly, these leaders did not even bother to 
consult the OAU, then the regional security body, but solicited sub-regional economic 
bodies for assistance.  The reason for avoiding the regional organization can be attributed 
to OAU conflict resolution mechanisms that were based on non-interference in the 
domestic affairs of other states especially those of interstate conflicts.  The leaders of the 
countries embroiled in conflict avoided the OAU, knowing that the response from the 
regional body would take time while focusing on mediation which would not help their 
cause.  They wanted quick action. 
   The sub-regional organizations offered that kind of alternative because of their 
direct impact each feels from the nearby conflict.  In addition, although the requests were 
officially addressed to sub-regional organizations, they were dispatched through the 
respective sub-regional hegemons, rather than the countries chairing the organizations at 
the time.  In the West, Liberian leader Samuel Doe opted to use Nigeria to route its 
request to the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) while in the 
South, Lesotho’s Prime Minister Pakalitha Mosisili opted for South Africa to raise his 
request to the South African Development Community (SADC).  This suggests the 
                                                 
5Falk, R., p 74 
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importance of sub-regional hegemons:  Samuel Doe and Pakalitha Mosisili knew that 
affirmative responses by the sub-regional organizations depended upon decisions made in 
Nigeria and South Africa. 
In the DRC case, President Laurent Kabila’s request was addressed directly to 
SADC as an organization and not to a particular state.  Although the DRC is part of 
SADC, the absence of a clear-cut hegemon in the Central African region propelled Kabila 
to consider the whole SADC organization as an option for his request.   The action of 
Kabila can also be attributed to the fact that leaders of some SADC member states, like 
Nelson Mandela and Robert Mugabe, realized that the conflict in DRC needed some form 
of sub-regional organization’s involvement non-existent in Central Africa.  This 
realization soon materialized when the DRC speedily admitted to being SADC member 
despite some leaders’ reluctance.  The reason for such a rapid admittance was precisely to 
afford Kabila a chance to formally request SADC assistance.  However, Kabila did not 
fully understand that sub-regional hegemons are the most effective vehicle to encourage 
sub-regional organizations to authorize intervention in a conflict area.  The other possible 
explanation is the relationship of Kabila and Mugabe who by then was a chairperson of 
SADC.  Possibly Kabila submitted his request knowing that Mogabe was a chairperson of 
SADC and that he would encourage other SADC member to assist him.  This argument 
may be supported by the reluctance of South Africa to recognize Zimbabwe, Angola and 
Namibia’s intervention as representing SADC in the DRC.  Nevertheless, the main issue 
is that had there been a hegemonic state in Central Africa, Kabila likely would have opted 
for the same route taken by Liberia and Lesotho in seeking intervention. 
The requests were followed by peacemaking interventions.  In the West, 
ECOWAS in the form of the ECOWAS Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) launched 
military peacemaking intervention in Liberia and Sierra Leone in 1990 and 1997 
respectively.  In the South, SADC conducted a similar intervention in Lesotho in 1998.  
In the absence of hegemonic commitment to peacemaking, the conflict in the DRC saw a 
number of military interventions by various African states, with members of SADC, 
4 
particularly Zimbabwe, stating that they were representing the sub-regional 
organization.6   
The interventions in Liberia and Lesotho are better understood as interventions by 
sub-regional hegemons, with the approval of the sub-regional organization.  The main 
financial and personnel commitments in both peacemaking operations were created by 
South Africa and Nigeria.  In Liberia, Nigeria contributed 70 percent of troops and 90 
percent of financial requirements; whereas, other states made up for the difference.7  In 
Lesotho, South Africa initiated the operation alone until nightfall when it was joined by 
Botswana with 200 troops.8  As reported the mission was accomplished by the time the 
Botswana troops arrive in Maseru.  This should not be surprising in light of the contrast 
between the authority of sub-regional organizations to intervene and the lack of resources 
and political will to do so.  It would be difficult, if not impossible, to initiate 
peacemaking intervention without the extensive assistance and motivation from sub-
regional hegemons. 
The tension between sub-regional organizations and sub-regional hegemons in 
peacemaking intervention is related to a demarcation of responsibility regarding 
disjuncture between the authority and obligation and the will and affordability to 
intervene.  The authority and obligation primarily rests with the organizations themselves 
with the power (military and resources) and the will (interest) resting with the sub-
regional hegemons.  This disjuncture creates a problem when it comes to peacemaking 
intervention in the African region.  Firstly, due to the absence of the international 
community, the sub-regional organizations are viewed as the legitimate bodies that can 
grant authority for any kind of peacemaking intervention taking place in the sub-region as 
a result, they also have a moral obligation of ensuring peace and stability in their 
respective spheres.  When a situation erupts, which requires appropriate measures to be 
taken by the organization, they find themselves faced with a lack of necessary resources 
for such actions, which ultimately leaves them no choice but to seek alternative sources 
                                                 
6 “Zimbabwe/DRCongo: Why we must intervene” Africanews 39 (June 1999), p 2 
7 Sesay, A., “West African Military Intervention in the 1990s: The Case of ECOWAS in Liberia and 
Sierra Leone” in Leone du Plessis and Michael Hough, op cit, p 210 
8 Neethling, T., “Southern African Military Intervention in the 1990s: The Case of SADC in Lesotho” 
in Leone du Plessis and Hough, op cit, p 287 
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of assistance.  Secondly, the sub-regional hegemons on the other hand possesses the 
necessary resources to ensure the successful launch of peacemaking intervention.  
However, to get the hegemons to participate in the peacemaking intervention as 
authorized by the sub-regional organization depends on the willingness of a hegemon.  
This is usually accompanied by some form of benefit known to generate interest 
(personal, collective or national).  These two elements can create a problem because, at 
times, the interest to a hegemon may not necessarily assure an automatic approval from 
the sub-regional organization simply because the hegemon is willing to contribute its 
resources.  In addition, what seems to be a moral acceptance by the sub-regional bodies 
does not guarantee the support of hegemons.   
These suggests conducting peacemaking intervention in Africa requires both the 
legitimacy and moral obligation that flow from the sub-regional organization and the 
significant resources that flow from the willingness and interest of the sub-regional 
hegemons to maintain regional peace and stability. Thus, whenever the need for 
peacemaking intervention develops in the African continent, there are mixed reactions 
pertaining to whose interest will be served or whose authority will be accepted. 
B. PURPOSE AND MAJOR ARGUMENTS AND RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
 
Military peacemaking interventions conducted in Africa during the 1990s by sub-
regional organizations display one outstanding feature.  Even though the formation and 
creation of sub-regional organizations is based on the notion that all the member states 
have an equal status and standing, an element of unequal contribution still exist when it 
comes to peacemaking interventions.  Due to the differences in economic capabilities and 
physical geographic size, some states tend to contribute a large portion of needed 
resources, such as military equipment, manpower and technical know-how, as compared 
to other willing member states during peacemaking military intervention. 
This thesis will argue that the emerging model of African military peacemaking 
intervention depends on the decision of such sub-regional hegemons to intervene 
militarily, which has major implications for peace and peacemaking in Africa.  The thesis 
considers two primary questions.  First, what motivates sub-regional hegemons to 
6 
participate in military peacemaking intervention in Africa?  The second question 
emanates from the first: what effects do these interventions, based on the identified 
motivations of the sub-regional hegemons, have on conflict resolution and regional 
security?  Have these interventions contributed effectively to the resolution of African 
conflicts, or have they exacerbated the situation? These questions derive from the 
observation that African military interventions of the 1990 are mainly and increasingly 
undertaken by the militarily strongest states.  Given the poor economic conditions of 
most African states and the peacemaking military interventions that require a significant 
economic backing and military capability, some states will have to shoulder more 
responsibility compared to others.  This has been the case in both the ECOWAS and 
SADC where Nigeria and South Africa were sub-regional hegemons during the military 
peacemaking interventions in their regions.  Without South Africa and Nigeria playing 
leading roles as hegemons during the military peacemaking interventions in their sub-
regions, the results could have been very different.9   
The ability of a sub-regional hegemon to participate in such an operation has 
ensured that the launching of peacemaking intervention becomes practical instead of 
symbolic, which has been the nature of African sub-regional organizations during the 
decades prior to the 1990s.  Prior to the 1990s, the African region was clouded by the 
involvement of Western powers in the affairs of their colonial surrogates, which limited 
the possibility of other stronger regional states contributing effectively to solving the 
conflicts.  The end of the Cold War led to the withdrawal of the external powers’ 
involvement and opened the opportunity for Africans to take matters in their own hands.  
This ultimately created a vacuum that was filled by the African hegemons when 
conducting peacemaking interventions.10  This then begs the question: under what 
conditions will these countries be willing to intervene?    
                                                 
9 Frederic S., Pearson and Robert A. Baumann, “International Military Intervention in Sub-Saharan 
Subsystems” Journal of Political and Military Sociology, vol. 17, Spring 1989, p 115 
10 This is not just a regional issue since it has played a devastating role in the effectiveness and 
efficiency of the UN as an international peacemaking intervention body.  The argument is that for any 
peace support operation (PSO) conducted under the auspices of the UN, there is always a need for a lead 
nation.  A lead nation is the state that will be willing to contribute a huge amount of resources as compared 
to other willing but ailing nations in the PSO.  Without such a state stepping forward and shouldering the 
responsibility, the mission will always achieve half-hearted results or even totally collapse. 
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Peacemaking intervention challenges the non-interference rule of both the UN and 
the OAU, which is the mainstay of their charters.  These articles were set up as the means 
to curb conflicts as well as to provide a mechanism to resolve already volatile situations. 
Military interventions as the development of the 1990s indicated that these principles are 
no longer effective because of the new developments of conflicts in the African 
continent.  One of such developments is the civil character of most conflicts mainly 
consist of rebel group formations as opposed to the traditional state to state conflicts with 
conventional militaries. Thus, the mechanisms setups by the regional body were meant 
for interstate conflicts, involving militaries who could not with the intrastate ones.  The 
intrastate conflicts also introduced a number of rebel factions that possesses military 
arsenals that have the same capability as most states in the region.  The disturbing factor 
is that most of the arsenals are not controlled as per international rules and regulations but 
simply change hands within the population, mainly on the informal market.  This, in 
itself, may generate a catastrophe in the already volatile situation in the continent of 
Africa.  In fact, the necessity of peacemaking interventions is motivated by the 
proliferation of conflicts in the African continent.  It is reported that in the period of a 
decade almost 5 million people, mostly civilians have been killed in conflicts.11 
C. METHODOLOGY AND ORGANIZATION 
 
Chapter II of this thesis will develop a theoretical framework for addressing the 
questions raised above and test this framework on the peacemaking interventions in 
Liberia, Lesotho, and the DRC.  Chapters III, IV and V present the case studies Liberia, 
Lesotho, and DRC, respectively.  Chapter VI draws conclusions based on comparative 
analysis of the case studies. 
In Chapter III, the hegemonic position of Nigeria will be assed in relation to the 
intervention in Liberia.  The other issues of interest, international law and morality will 
be assessed in accordance to their utility in legitimizing and legalizing peacemaking 
intervention.  Chapter VI addresses the question of whether the interventions that took 
                                                 
11 Rotberg, I. R., “Peacekeeping and Effective Prevention of War” in Rotberg, R. I. (et al), 
Peacekeeping and Peace Enforcement in Africa: Methods of Conflict Prevention (Brookings Institution 
Press, 2000), p 10  
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place in the DRC where the result of the absence of a hegemon or other issues such as 
interest and moral influence.  In Chapter V, the hegemonic role of South Africa and its 
intervention in Lesotho is assessed from the perspective of the issues involving power 
relations, interest, international law and morality.  The main question is whether the 
intervention in Lesotho was influenced by South African parochial interest or its 
responsibility as a sub-regional hegemon.  Chapter VI presents a comparative analysis of 
all the three case studies with regard to peacemaking intervention in the African 
continent.  The analysis allows for determination of future impact of such interventions in 
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II: THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
A. THE STATES’ MOTIVATIONS TO ACT: REALIST AND GLOBALIST 
PARADIGMS 
 
The end of the Cold War has witnessed a lively debate on peacemaking military 
intervention, which reflects two broad contending perspectives, namely “realist” and 
“globalist.”  Broadly speaking, the realists believe that states do not act unselfishly in the 
international system, as they are inclined to pursue parochial national interests.  
According to this school of thought, when states conduct peacemaking interventions in 
the domestic affairs of other states, apparently on behalf of the international community, 
they do so not only to secure political and diplomatic support and consensus but also to 
camouflage their own national interests.  Globalists, on the other hand, believe that the 
post-Cold War international system constitutes what can loosely be called a global 
community.  Thus when states undertake peacemaking interventions, they do so primarily 
to alleviate human suffering in the target state.     
Furthermore, globalists argue that the international community ought to intercede 
to prevent bloodshed by whatever means available.12  They further argue that states 
should no longer be allowed to hide behind sovereignty in the face of massive human 
rights violations and/or genocide.  Implicit in the globalists plea for humanitarian 
intervention is their acknowledgement of the imperatives of globalization that among 
other things has turned the world into a global village.  The result is what Weiss and 
Chopra call global “moral interdependence” and expanded “humanitarian space.”13  The 
globalist’s view was adopted by the UN in 1992 when it created the Department of 
Humanitarian Affairs in the Secretariat with Security Resolution 688 which linked 
internal repression to refugee flows.  Ultimately this defined threats of international peace 
and security.  This initiative paved the way for the UN uninvited humanitarian 
intervention in Somalia in 1993.  This UN position brought into sharp focus what was 
                                                 
12 Lyons, G. M. and Mastanduno, M., “Introduction” in Beyond Westphalia, (Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 1995), p 12 
13 Weiss, T. and Chopra, J., in Beyond Westphalia, op cit, p 111 
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accepted by the scholars of foreign policy long before globalization became a buzz word, 
that in an increasing interdependent world, the division between what is domestic and 
what is external to a state is a very thin one.”14 
According to the realist perspective, peacemaking military intervention can still 
be best understood in terms of power and interest while the globalist’s view international 
law and moral principles as also playing significant roles.  Thus, while globalists have 
justified expanding international intervention, realists warn that hegemons “may cloak 
their interests in the language of the common good and may claim to be acting in the 
name of the international community.”15  Sub-regional hegemons often try to obtain 
multilateral consensus after initiating and orchestrating peacemaking interventions, “in 
order to achieve their hidden agendas in the target states.”16 
The realist paradigm suggests two factors that are likely to be important in a sub-
regional hegemon's decision to undertake a peacemaking intervention: power and 
interest.  The globalist paradigm suggests two completely different factors: international 
law and morality.  In fact, as I will argue in this thesis, all four elements have a direct 
impact on a sub-regional hegemon's decision to intervene.   
1. Power 
The first and the most recognized issue with respect to any intervention is the 
necessity of power projection.  Given that conflicts within particular states and especially 
African states, with readily permeable borders- cannot be insulated from their wider 
regional setting, intervention must inevitably reflect and, in turn, affect regional power 
relations.17  Considerations of power relations within a region highlight the critical issues 
of sub-regional hegemony and the projection of the power in approaching peacekeeping 
military interventions. 
The most critical issue facing effective regional security systems is that of 
leadership.  Initiating and encouraging peacemaking intervention is extremely difficult 
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unless one state is prepared to take the initiative to commit the necessary resources, to 
accept the inevitable costs, and to put together a coalition with other states in the sub-
region that are prepared to devote some of their own resources towards the operation.  
According to Clapham, 
Leadership is central to any effective security system and the very uneven 
distribution of capabilities among the states within a particular region 
often preordains certain states to take a leading role.  At the same time, it 
is essential that this role should be accepted by other states within the 
region and limited by conventions that prevent it from degenerating into 
the mere imposition of domination by regional hegemons over their 
weaker neighbors.18 
The way a sub-regional hegemon is perceived by its weaker neighbors is 
important.  When the hegemon is perceived as a source of security and protection for 
weaker and more vulnerable states, the weaker states tend to ally with the hegemon in a 
process described as ‘bandwagoning’.19  A hegemon tends to utilize this kind of 
opportunity to influence the other states in the sub-region to join in its decision to launch 
peacemaking intervention.  However, this preferred roadway can be used to shield other 
hidden agendas of the hegemon.   
For sub-regional hegemons to be effective in its effort to mount peacemaking 
intervention, there is clearly a need exist for such a state to combine various element, 
such as military might, economic dominance and other important areas such as the 
availability of manpower.  The possessions of such elements open-up the needed 
influence when it comes to peacemaking intervention.  Huntington argues that hegemonic 
politics is also always about power and its struggle and that today international relations 
is changing along that crucial dimension.  He further argues that a regional system will 
have one hegemonic power, no significant powers, and many minor powers.  As a result, 
the hegemonic power could effectively resolve important regional issues alone without 
any combination of other states have the power to prevent it from doing so.20   The 
course, “is the sole state with preeminence in every domain hegemon in the sub-region of                                                  
18 Ibid 
19 Robert Jervis and Jack Snyder, eds., Dominoes and Bandwagons: Strategic Beliefs and Great 
Power Competition in the Eurasian Rimland, (Oxford University Press, 1991) 
20 Samuel P. Huntington, “The Lonely Superpower”, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 78, No. 2 (March/April 
1999), p 35  
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of power-economic, military, diplomatic, and technological-with the reach and 
capabilities to promote its interest in virtually every part of the region.”21  He adds a 
caveat when he mentions that a hegemonic power can also be looked at in terms of its 
ability to work with others in the interests of the region as a whole because of the 
hegemon’s willingness to pay the costs for peacemaking operations and to accept the 
risks of unilateral regional leadership.22 
In order for other states in the sub-region to acknowledge the power of a hegemon 
in the sub-region, it should exercise its position in a tactfully.  This point is supported by 
Yorums and Aning in their analysis of hegemonic power.  They argue that hegemonic 
power is based on two dimensions, “hegemony–as-influence” and “hegemony-as–
leadership.  The difference between these two is emphasized by the delineation of 
“hegemony as influence” as the power to sway or to affect the behavior of others based 
on prestige, wealth, ability or status. “Hegemony-as-leadership,” on the other hand, refers 
to the deliberate effort to guide the deeds and opinions of others or to be the guiding 
character in a collective process.  They also argue that the appropriate way of identifying 
a hegemonic state in the region is necessary to determine the extent to which power and 
power relations in the region can or are in a position to predict the likelihood of 
peacemaking military interventions.23 
The conduct as well as the outcome of the decision to launch peacemaking 
intervention is absolutely based on how a sub-regional hegemon behaves in the region, 
particularly when it comes to its relations with the other states in the sub-region.  Robert 
Gilpin provides a good theoretical framework for a better understanding of hegemonic 
behavior in the international system that can also be applied to sub-regional politics in 
mounting peacemaking military intervention.  In this theory, a hegemon is defined as the 
leadership of one state over the other states in a system.  The definition is given more 
specific meaning by examining the type of leadership activities in which a hegemonic 
state engages.  A hegemon takes a position of leadership in the international system to 
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expand its influence and control and to reap greater economic and security benefits.24  It 
pursues these expansive tendencies through economic, political and military dominance.  
Therefore, for peacemaking intervention to succeed, sub-regional hegemons should be 
able to combine the economic, political and military elements, which are clearly 
acknowledged by other states in the region. 
However, coercive power is not only essential when it comes to the hegemonic 
influence but it is also beneficial to other states.  A hegemon succeeds partially because it 
overwhelms lesser states and because it provides public goods and services that benefit 
other states.  In return, the hegemonic state gains more by establishing its dominance in 
this way than it pays for the cost of these actions.  Gilpin cites the examples of the Pax 
Britannia and Pax Americana as examples of hegemonic states imposing peace and 
security on the international system in such a way as to benefit the hegemonic state.25 
This framework, unfortunately, does not acknowledge the role and existence of 
hegemons in regional/sub-regional systems.  However, the theoretical framework can be 
used as a measure for evaluating the behavior and influence of hegemons on a micro-
scale.  The framework is additionally helpful when it further suggests that a hegemon will 
involve itself in cooperative action either exclusively for its own beneficial reasons or for 
the benefit of whole regions.  These actions may or may not consequently benefit the 
region.  Since, by definition, a hegemon is a leader, the hegemonic state will likely take a 
dominant role in whatever action it chooses to participate.  Its motivations and actions 
can affect relations with the other participants who will, in turn, affect the performance of 
the actors and the outcome of cooperative action. 
The acceptance and acknowledgment of a sub-regional hegemon by other states in 
the sub-region is the first factor influencing whether a hegemon will intervene through 
peacemaking operations.  The reason this is essential in the African continent is its 
association with the historical legacy of state to state relations, mainly based on suspicion 
due to the permeable territorial boundaries and colonial exploitation experiences.  The 
problem with the boundaries is related with the cross-border ethnic linkages, which may 
                                                 




be used by other states as a pretext to claim for attempting to annex a piece of territory 
from the other state.  Many African states have a significant percentage of their 
population sharing common ethnical connections, which create an imbalance in terms of 
which population belongs to which state.  The problem has always generated regional 
tensions because at some stage members of an ethnic group in one state might perceive 
that their ethnic kin are treated badly in another state. This difference encourages 
unacceptable treatment of the minority in the other states whose leaders are members of 
the different minority ethnic group in the other state.  This situation has been reflected in 
deadly conflicts in the Great Lakes region of Africa (Burundi, Rwanda and Uganda).  
The other factor, likely to be related to a favorable decision for a hegemonic state 
to intervene, is the power of economic capability of such a state.  Clearly involvement in 
peacemaking intervention requires formidable resources for the operation to commence, 
and since the poor economic status of many African states is also known, a decision to 
intervene may not be forthcoming.  This is where the power of the hegemon comes in; 
this power is also based on economic capability that then becomes essential in 
influencing the hegemon’s decision to intervene in peacemaking military intervention.  
Economic power needs to be supported by an element of military capability 
because it is only through military instrument that peace can be achieved in a conflict 
area.  An important fact to know is whenever a hegemon decides to launch peacemaking 
intervention; it will probably face rebel groups possessing some sophisticated military 
hardware as well as the know-how capability to utilize this.  This necessitates the need 
for a hegemon to also posses in its arsenal some sophisticated military instruments feared 
by the opponents as well as by the personnel that handles such equipment.  
From this element of power a realist’s hypothesis can be developed in relation to 
its influence on the decision of a sub-regional hegemon to intervene: sub-regional 
peacemaking intervention is more likely when a hegemonic power is economically 
formidable and its position is acknowledged by other states in the region, whether 





The concept of national interest continues to serve a useful role in determining the 
state’s motivations to engage in peacekeeping military intervention.  Alexander George 
and Robert Keohane distinguish different types of interest as a means to clarifying this 
fuzzy concept.26  Although their discussion is general, it can be applied to the question of 
peacemaking military intervention to identifying the interests that might motivate such 
action. 
First, George and Keohane discuss the concept of self-regarding interest that deals 
with the question of whose interests are principally involved with respect to peacemaking 
military intervention, the argument here is that sub-regional hegemons will be motivated 
by issues associated with their national identity and survival when they contemplate 
getting involved in peacemaking intervention.  The issues at hand are the preservation of 
the state’s territory and lives and property of its citizens. This category is directly related 
to the realist perspective that states are inclined to pursue parochial national interests.  
What makes this element important is its accountability and responsibility of a 
government to its constituents, which means that the issues of greatest concern to 
domestic constituents will become number one priorities when it comes to a hegemon’s 
decision to intervene. The argument is that the preservation of citizen life is one of the 
elements of state interest.  
The second concept is other-regarding interests, which in the context of this thesis 
purports that sub-regional hegemons will partake in peacemaking intervention not out of 
consideration of their own benefit but for the sake of being members of the international 
community.  This concept is aligned with the globalist perspective because of its belief in 
hegemons as not driven by parochial interest but by the moral obligation.  The argument 
which underlines this concept is based on the notion that a state will participate in 
peacemaking military intervention for the sake of ending the conflict on behalf of the 
people or the government of the other state because they cannot afford to do it 
themselves. 
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The third concept is collective interest, which in this thesis involves the notion 
that the decision of sub-regional hegemons to partake in peacemaking intervention stems 
from the belief that intervention will not just benefit themselves but also the sub-region as 
well as the international community.  The rationale stemming from this concept is that 
peacemaking intervention is a necessity for the hegemons which will, in turn, be 
beneficial to the regional peace and stability and thus serving the long term objectives of 
the hegemons.  Both the realist and globalist’s perspective supports this argument 
because of its middle ground position this concept occupy, i.e. states act out of self-
interest but interdependence creates a common interests so self-interest requires acting 
for collective good. 
The fourth concept which is not covered by George and Keohane in their criterion 
and of which is an important aspect in most third world countries, particularly in the 
African continent, is personal interest.  It is imperative to keep in mind that in developing 
countries the head of state epitomizes the state itself; Africa is not unique in that regard.  
According to Sesay,  
 
African leaders are the state in their respective countries.  As such, even 
major policy decisions could be made merely to satisfy these leaders’ 
whims and caprices, no matter what the long-term consequences might be 
for the state and its citizens.  The situation is exacerbated in crisis periods, 
and under military dictatorships, because relatively little or no time exists 
for broad-based consultations.27  
 
Understanding that the motivations of sub-regional hegemons must include not 
only traditional national security interests, but also the personal interest and motivations 
of African leaders who are only very lightly constrained, if at all, by state institutions. 
National interest plays a significant role in motivating a sub-regional hegemon 
towards a favorable decision to participate in peacemaking intervention.  For any state to 
act in a peacemaking intervention it should provide an acceptable justification to its 
domestic constituency because without such an explanation the policymakers are faced 
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with losing their political position.  In Africa it can be argued that is no clear demarcation 
exist between state and personal interests for those in the leadership position; 
nevertheless, this does not eliminate the fact that some sort of explanation is still needed 
in order to legitimize their use of state resources.  The type of interest involved also 
affects the urgency of the expected decision from the hegemonic state.  If the conflict 
taking place in the other state in the region affects the self-regarding interest of the 
hegemon, it then becomes more imperative for the decision to be made urgently as 
opposed to other-regarding or collective interest. An example may be the difference 
between the Nigerian peacemaking intervention in Chad 1964 and Liberia 1992 
respectively.  In the case of Chad, Nigeria’s decision was taken unilaterally without 
consultation of the ECOWAS because of the closer proximity of the two states. Thus, the 
fear of the eminent repercussion from the conflict into Nigeria was quickly realized.  
Unlike in Liberia the decision was taken in consultation with the sub-regional 
organization because the conflict was not as damaging to the Nigerian state.  From this 
element, a realist hypothesis can be drawn with regard to a hegemon decision to intervene 
in peacemaking intervention: sub-regional peacemaking is more likely when the interests 
of the hegemon are at stake.  The more the interests are self-regarding interests the 
greater the threat to those interests, the more likely intervention becomes.   
3. International Law 
During the decade of the 1990s, a trend emerged justifying some cases of 
peacemaking military intervention, even if the international law did not formally 
acknowledge that right.  Thus, the growing tension between the legitimacy and legality of 
peacemaking military intervention became clear at the end of the 1990s, not only to 
scholars but also to governments and public opinion.  That tension truly was indicative of 
the process of change in international law that was underway.  International law, 
especially rules of a customary nature, normally lags well behind political, moral and 
social developments.  International law has its own rules for change with their purpose 
being to ensure that general sentiment towards legitimacy and new political 
developments remains constant.  During transitional periods, international law can be 
somewhat contradictory because it must strike a balance between old and new values. 
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Some significant events took place in the 1990s and have influenced the evolution 
of the rules of international law concerning non-intervention.  The ECOMOG in Liberia 
and Sierra Leone in 1990 and 1997, and SADC in Lesotho in 1998 were peacemaking 
military interventions that were not regarded as illegal by states.  Consequently these 
interventions were not condemned by the international community.  While the 
circumstances in all of these cases were not entirely the same, the perception that they 
were acceptable necessitated their establishment in international law.  The second event 
was the evolution of international law in the 1990s the “internationalization” of the 
protection of human rights, which thereby removed them from the domestic jurisdiction 
of states.  Thirdly, resolute UN Security Council action in the 1990s to prevent 
humanitarian crises, restored peace in states torn by civil strife while rebuilding societies 
that also laid the groundwork for a reformulation of the principle of non-intervention.  
The Security Council not only agreed on concrete measures that would help alleviate 
humanitarian crises, but it also decided to reinforce respect for humanitarian law by 
creating, in the aftermath of several conflicts (including former Yugoslavia and Rwanda), 
international criminal courts. 
There is still an acknowledging that peacemaking runs counter to the previously 
held norm of non-intervention and the related tenets and rules of international law that 
govern justified intervention.  What these interventions show, however, is the inadequacy 
of the law, drawn up half a century ago and marked by notions of sovereign power and 
international order no longer sustainable. Four characteristics distinguish and establish 
peacemaking intervention legitimate, despite the proscriptions of international law.   
20 
First, peacemaking intervention gives concrete expression to the emerging norm 
of such intervention in the pursuit of peace and humanitarian concerns, particularly where 
genocide and gross violations of human rights occur.  Second, as a collective 
intervention, multilateral peace support operations require a UN mandate in the form of a 
Security Council resolution and similar resolutions from other intergovernmental 
organizations (ECOWAS and SADC), as well as impartiality or neutrality on the part of 
the intervening forces.  This is clearly different from military intervention undertaken as a 
one-sided action irrespective of whether one or more states intervene to the conflict at the 
explicit invitation and on behalf of a party (as happened in the DRC).  Third, this type of 
intervention must also be mandated and legitimized by broad acceptance by the 
international community of states, i.e. the “critical mass of nations.”28  Finally, this 
intervention does not always comply with the established legal precepts that govern 
military intervention.  In some instances, no request for intervention was made in 
advance by the government or governing authority of the target territory.  In these 
instances collective intervention was unilaterally initiated by and undertaken by the 
auspices of an intergovernmental organization, to be condoned, mandated and sanctioned 
after the event by the said organization.  This indicates that actions and means are 
morally justified and not illegal; however they are not yet legally regulated, and 
therefore, not legal either.29  
The problematic concept of international law with regard to peacemaking military 
interventions is one of the fundamental issues analyzed by Martin Ortega30, lecturer in 
international law and research fellow at the Institute for Security Studies of Western 
European Union (WEU) since 1997.  In his paper, he proposes new conditions by which 
to determine the best possible link between the legality, legitimacy and political 
opportuneness of military interventions.  National sovereignty, of course, remains the 
basic principle on which the international order is founded: respect for the territorial 
integrity of states and non-interference in their internal affairs are the foundations of 
international law as codified by the Charter of the United Nations.  Nonetheless, the 
principle of sovereignty has always been rich in perverse effects.  Certainly, attempting to 
combine respect for states’ sovereignty, human rights and the principle of self-
determination has always been one of the international order’s major deadlocks. 
The concept of national sovereignty has also played a prominent role in the 
African continent, particularly based on the principle of non-interference in the internal 
affairs of other states.  Since its birth in Addis Ababa on May 25, 1963, the OAU has 
proclaimed to the world its commitment and competence as the primary agency to 
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intervene or rather to mediate in African conflicts.31  A key element of the charter of the 
OAU is surely the member states’ commitment to the principle of “peaceful settlement of 
disputes by negotiation, mediation, conciliation or arbitration.”32  However, much of the 
commitment by the member states in the OAU was concerned with the interstate conflicts 
rather than the intrastate. 
Three factors serve to emphasize the OAU stand on the above issue.  First, the 
charter of the OAU was based on determining interstate-system rather than on the 
intrastate-system solutions.  With this went adherence to the principle of non-interference 
in the internal matters of other sovereign entities.  Second, the OAU charter 
institutionalized recognition of the existing colonial borders.  The last factor was based 
on the non-conflictual rule, which governed the charter of the OAU. 
These factors reflected and, to an extent, governed state behavior in the OAU to a 
remarkable degree, resulting in the region being in the 1960s and early 1970s largely free 
from interstate conflicts.33  For example, the OAU mediation and diplomatic pressure 
helped dampen and/or to resolve boundary disputes between Algeria and Morocco and 
also among Kenya, Somalia and Ethiopia.34  However, this fixation of the OAU towards 
interstate relations led to isolating of internal conflicts in the African continent that 
threatened the regional stability, which was to be the cornerstone of the organization.  
Thus, the OAU and its member states were reasonably successful in insulating disputes, 
such as the Nigerian civil war from external military involvement,35 in preventing 
disputes between member states from escalating into armed conflict,36 and in limiting and 
resolving those conflicts which occurred.37  The failure of the OAU as a regional security 
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body was reinforced by the belief that intervention in the internal matters of member 
states was unnecessary, because the national elites in the African region are largely 
concerned with personal enrichment rather than peace and stability in the region. 
The majority of the principles contained in the OAU Charter are clearly opposed 
to intervention, particularly military intervention.  Clearly from this premise that, the 
OUA was tailored means specifically to deal with interstate conflicts and not aimed to 
intervene in the internal affairs of African states.  A resolution was passed at the OAU 
summit held in Libreville, Gabon in 1977, which condemned all non-African interference 
in the continent.  This led to the formation of committee in 1978 that managed the 
conflicts between African states that generally invited external military intervention.  
However, because of the lack of a proper mechanism to deal with internal issues, the 
summit was forced to uphold the right of every independent African state to call upon 
friendly countries outside the continent for assistance if they perceived that their security 
and sovereignty was under threat.38 
The OAU, for instance, did not condemn the external military interventions in 
Shaba province in Zaire to support Mobutu during 1977 and 1978 respectively, 
presumably because the interventions did not threaten the integrity of neighboring states.  
However, this abstinence of the OAU was due to the organization’s weak military and 
political base, and constrains of its own non-interference clauses.39 
Supporters of a different role for the OAU because of the number of internal 
conflicts forwarded various proposals, including the proposal for an African High 
Command, based on the concept of continental defense agreement.  It was, however, not 
made clear whether this would pertain to dealing with interstate or intrastate conflicts.  
The Kampala Document of 1991, although not an official OAU document, repeated the 
call, with specific reference to external military aggression by non-African states against 
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the continent or any member state.  The military operations envisaged under these 
structures were distinguished from peace support operations.40 
Based on the adopted position of non-interference in the internal matters of 
another state by the OAU, it became clear.  The OAU, as a regional organization, has 
admittedly failed to serve as a mechanism to deal with African conflicts, since they are 
largely domestic in character or they are an alternative option to contemporary solutions.  
However, some indications are that some of the leaders in the OAU are starting to 
question some of the articles in the charter.  The OAU Secretary-General made the 
following comment during the OAU summit held in Senegal in July 1992: 
 
It is arguable, therefore, that within the context of general international 
law as well as humanitarian law, Africa should take the lead in developing 
the notion that sovereignty can legally be transcended by the ‘intervention’ 
of ‘outside forces’, by their will to facilitate prevention and/or resolution, 
particularly on humanitarian grounds. In other words, given that every 
African is his brother’s keeper, and that our borders are at best artificial, 
we in Africa need to use our own cultural and social relationship to 
interpret the principle of non-interference in such a way that we are 
enabled to apply it to advantage in conflict prevention and resolution.41 
 
Thus, there has been a shift in the emphasis regarding the non-interference 
principles of the OAU charter.  The initiative, as far as peacemaking military intervention 
is concerned, has passed to sub-regional organizations, such as ECOWAS and SADC, 
with the assistance of some clear-cut sub-regional hegemons, such as Nigeria and South 
Africa, and the with (ex post facto) blessing of the OAU. 
However, since the end of the Cold War, a new regulation has gradually been put 
into place that will, in the long term, make it possible to redefine the basis and legitimacy 
of military interventions, above all, even in the absence of a UN mandate.  One of the 
new basic assumptions of the international order in gestation is that sovereignty can never 
be a pretext for genocide, a principle that is perhaps the most stabilizing for international 
                                                 
40 OAU, Kampala Document for a Proposed Conference on Security, Stability, Development and 
Cooperation in Africa (CSSDCA), Kampala, Uganda, 23 May 1991, p 17 
41 OAU, Resolving Conflicts in Africa: Proposals for Action, 1992, p 17 
24 
security in the twenty-first century.  The main question that has to be dealt with regarding 
peacemaking military interventions is “whether the international community has a ‘right’ 
to intervene to respond to human suffering or political instability, with or without 
government agreement.”42  The dilemma of peacemaking military intervention with 
regard to international law can be traced since the beginning of post-Cold War period.  
This dilemma was highlighted by Javier Perez de Cuellar, former Secretary-General of 
the UN in his address at the University of Bordeaux, in the spring of 1991, when he 
stated that: 
 
[T]he right to intervene has been given renewed relevance by recent 
political events… We are clearly witnessing what is probably an 
irresistible shift in public attitude the belief that defense of the oppressed 
in the name of morality should prevail over the frontiers and legal 
documents.”  Nevertheless, he asked, “[D]oes it not call into question one 
of the cardinal principles of international law, one diametrically opposed 
to it, namely, the obligation of non-interference in the internal affairs of 
States?”  In acknowledgment of this tension between the necessity of 
intervention and prevailing norms of international society, de Cuellar 
called upon the international legal community to help develop a “new 
concept, one which marries law and morality.43 
 
More recently, Boutros Boutros-Ghali reaffirmed the problem in his report to the 
UN Security Council on strengthening the capacity of the world organization in matters 
of international peace and security.44  “Respect for [a state’s] fundamental sovereignty 
and integrity” he wrote, is “crucial to any common international progress.”  Nevertheless, 
he continued, “the time of absolute and exclusive sovereignty… has passed”; for that 
matter, “its theory was never matched by reality.”  While his statement did not offer 
solution to the dilemma, he did emphasize the need for governments to understand that 
sovereignty is not absolute and that it can no longer be used as an excuse to avoid 
peacemaking military intervention.  
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“Today, we ask whether recent political changes-the immediate changes that have 
emerged with the ending of the cold war and the deeper changes that have come with 
increasing interdependence-have precipitated a shift in the balance between the sovereign 
rights and authority of states and the right and authority of larger international 
community.”  Lyons and Mastanduno ask whether the world is currently witnessing the 
emergence and recognition of a legitimate “right” to intervene in the domestic affairs of 
member states in the name of community norms, values, or interests. 
In sum, the rules of international law concerning peacemaking military 
intervention are still based on the legalistic principle of non-intervention elaborated 
between 1945 and the end of the Cold War.  In the 1990s, however, these norms started 
to change quite radically as a consequence of UN Security Council practice and enhanced 
international protection of human rights.  The critical question, however, is under what 
circumstances the international community is justified in overriding sovereignty to 
protect the dispossessed population within state borders.  The common assumption in 
international law is that to justify such action, there must be a threat to international peace 
and security.  The position now supported by the Security Council is that massive 
violations of human rights and displacement within a country’s borders may constitute 
such a threat.45 
The absence of international community involvement in the African continent 
since the beginning of the post-Cold war period, particularly in conflict resolution, and 
the weakness of the OAU as an effective regional conflict mechanism have created a 
void, which has been filled by the sub-regional organizations.  Thus, legal mandates to 
intervene are now shouldered by sub-regional organizations.  The problem with this new 
responsibility is that for the sub-regional organization to be effective, given the alarming 
position of the continent as compared to others, the hegemon’s must assist at all cost, 
which in turn, somewhat hands over the legal mandate to such hegemons.  This implies 
that the occurrence of peacemaking intervention depends on the legal blessing of the sub-
regional organization in the sub-region. A globalist hypothesis can be drawn from the 
discussion of this element of international law as element in peacemaking intervention: 
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sub-regional peacemaking is more likely when the sub-regional organization’s 
assessment of the conflict situation is viewed as transcending sovereignty claims because 
it involves unacceptable humanitarian sufferings. 
4. Morality 
Peacemaking interventions cannot be separated from the ethics of world politics; 
thus, they confront decision makers with moral dilemmas.46  Moral concerns are a major 
cause, and, therefore, a primary source of justification for the intervenient use of military 
force.  In this respect the notion of legitimate or justifiable peacemaking intervention 
relates to a rights-based approach to intervention which incorporates the circumstances 
that justify and the rules that dictate and regulate forcible intervention. 
The concept of humanitarian intervention has been legitimated in connection to 
the imposition of a refugee burden on neighboring states.  That grounds a right both in 
customary international law and under Chapter VII of the UN Charter of intervention and 
/or enforcement action not subject to the limits of purely humanitarian intervention.47  
The threat to peace and security justifies invoking Chapter VII of the UN charter, which 
overrides the claim of sovereignty and domestic jurisdiction.  Luise Drake argues that in 
respect to internal or domestic conflict that cause massive flows of refugees, “there is an 
emerging consensus on the legitimacy of taking action in the country of origin so that 
people would not have to flee.”48 
Yewdall Jennings has argued that traditional doctrines do not provide a legal basis 
for action against a state that generates refugees.  However, he acknowledges that general 
and customary international law is relevant when considering the legality or the conduct 
of a state which creates a refuge crisis.49  On the other hand, Dowty and Loescher argue 
that recent trends in international opinion tend to favor a broader definition of state 
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responsibility, which includes prevention harm to others.50  The UN commissioned “new 
flows” group declared that “averting massive flows of refugees is a matter of serious 
concern to the international community as a whole and that such flows carry adverse 
consequences for the economies of the countries of origin and the entire region, thus 
endangering international peace and security.”51 
Terrence Lyons and Ahmed I. Samatar contend that “as global concern for 
humanitarian issues increases, ‘the balance between sovereignty and suffering is shifting 
in favor of greater international sensitivity to the claims of those who suffer’ and greater 
impatience with the obstructionism of uncaring governments.”52  However, the most 
decisive statement in debate on the balance between sovereignty and limits of 
intervention may be attributed to the former UN Secretary General, Boutros Boutros-
Ghali.  In concise language he wrote that “the time of absolute and exclusive 
sovereignty… has passed; it is theory and has never matched by reality.”53  Thomas 
Weiss and Larry Minear wrote that “the world is poised between the Cold War and an 
embryonic new humanitarian order… in which life threatening suffering and human 
rights abuses become legitimate international concerns irrespective of where they take 
place.”54  
Africa is perhaps the most devastated by internal conflicts and their catastrophic 
consequences.  “Of the estimated 30 million internally displaced persons worldwide, 
about 16 million are African, as are 7 million of the 20 million refugees in the world.”55  
One can, therefore, argue that international, regional or sub-regional response to the 
consequence of conflict is therefore motivated as much by common interest in global 
peace and security as by humanitarian concerns.  The contemporary international climate 
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gives support to the erosion of sovereignty is in favor of human rights protection and 
humanitarian intervention. 
 
Consequently, the sharing of sovereignty begins on the sub-regional and 
regional levels.  The role played by the ECOWAS in Liberia and Sierra 
Leone, the SADC in Lesotho and Mozambique, the Intergovernmental 
Authority on Drought and Development(IGADD) in Sudan and Somalia, 
and the Arab-Maghrib Union (UMA) in the Western Sahara are indicative 
of new attempts to exercise sub-regional responsibility and accountability 
within the regional framework.56 
 
Deng argue that “the interconnection of regional security situations, and in 
particular the spillover effects of conflicts, have direct impact on countries of the region 
concerned.  Beyond the region, the tragedies that result from internal conflicts are nearly 
always the concern of the international community.  All these impose responsibilities on 
governments, which limit their national sovereignty and make them accountable to both 
the national population and the international community.”57   This argument implies that 
the repercussions of refugee movement on other states in the region, may trigger a moral 
obligation that motivates sub-regional hegemons to contemplate peacemaking 
intervention.  
This element of morality plays a significant contemporary role in justifications for 
sub-regional hegemons to contemplate peacemaking intervention, but it also influenced 
by the element of interest.  A known factor is that whenever conflict erupts, it leads to 
displacement of a population, famine and other atrocities, which leads to huge migration 
of people towards a better environment.  Given that the capacity of most African states is 
not adequate to feed their own population, what if such a state is when faced with 
millions of refugees seeking protection and security?  Additionally, what may encourage 
a hegemon decision towards a positive involvement is the concern that only African are 
in a better position to provide assistance to a fellow African who is in distress as well as 
ensuring a general welfare of their populations.  Hegemons find themselves in a better 
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moral position and thus, contemplate launching a peacemaking intervention in the 
conflict state.   
This may be particularly true in the case of Nigeria in Chad because by then the 
government in Nigeria was faced with the problem of legitimacy in the eyes of its own 
citizens.  Furthermore, during the Liberian conflict, the Nigerian government, at that 
time, was a military dictatorship which did not have much legitimacy to most people in 
the state.  A globalists’ hypothesis may be drawn from this element of morality: sub-
regional peacemaking intervention is more likely when a humanitarian carnage in the 
sub-region resulting from conflict in a particular state. 
In conclusion, clearly all the four elements have a direct impact on the hegemon’s 
decision to contemplate peacemaking intervention, but what this thesis will highlight is 
the dilemma of peacemaking intervention when it comes to the proper execution of such 
operations.  The disjuncture between the sub-regional possessions of the resources 
needed in peacemaking intervention supporting the realists’ notion of power and 
interests, and the sub-regional organizations possession of the authority and obligation to 
deal with conflicts in their region, which supports the globalists’ notion of international 
law and morality.  These elements of power, interest, international law and morality will 
be the variables that guide the assessment of the case studies to test hypotheses outlined 
above. 
Drawing from all the four elements discussed above, this thesis developed a 
number of hypotheses that will be tested in the chapter III, IV and V respectively.  The 
first two hypotheses are related to a realist’s perspective, while the other two are based 
from the globalist’s perspective.  First, sub-regional peacemaking intervention is more 
likely when a hegemonic power is economically formidable and its position is 
acknowledged by other states in the sub-region, whether explicitly or implicitly.  Second, 
sub-regional peacemaking is more likely when the interests of hegemon are at stake.  The 
more the interests are self-regarding and personal interests-the greater the threat to those 
interests, the more likely intervention becomes.  Third, sub-regional peacemaking 
intervention is more likely when the sub-regional organization’s assessment of the 
conflict situation is viewed as transcending sovereignty claims because it involves 
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unacceptable humanitarian sufferings.  Fourth, sub-regional peacemaking intervention is 
more likely when there is a humanitarian carnage in the sub-region resulting from a 
conflict in a particular state.  The last hypothesis is based on the initial argument that all 
the variables (power, interest, international law and morality) are collectively necessary 
to the success of peacemaking intervention, because if one is missing, successful 

























































III. WEST AFRICAN PEACEMAKING MILITARY 
INTERVENTION IN THE 1990S: THE CASE OF ECOWAS IN 
LIBERIA  
A.  INTRODUCTION 
 
The ECOWAS (Economic Community of West African States) was established in 
May 1975 as an organization to promote the development of the sub-region.  For fifteen 
years this organization did not deviate from this mandate.58  The 16 member states of 
ECOWAS included Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Cote d’Ivoire, Gambia, Ghana, 
Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone 
and Togo.  ECOWAS mainly restricted their interactions to purely economic matters and 
less focused on political issues confronting West Africa.  Political matters were mostly 
left up to states to deal with each other.  The economic rationales for integrative schemes 
of ECOWAS are clearly spelt out in Article 2(1) of the treaty.  The article states that 
ECOWAS seeks “to promote cooperation and development in all fields of economic 
activity, for the purpose of increasing and maintaining economic stability.” 
However, a mechanism was put in place handle the possibility of interstate 
conflicts; whereas, intrastate matters were completely based on a non-interference 
principle.  The events that ensued in Liberia in 1989 changed this tradition in the 1990s 
when ECOWAS decided to intervene in this civil war.  What clearly came out from this 
decision was that “nothing in the history of ECOWAS had prepared it for either of these 
roles. As a regional economic organization, it lacked the institutions and procedures, 
which could provide the framework for the operation in Liberia.”59 
The emergence and spread of the Liberian crisis resulted from the failure of the 
ECOWAS to recognize the need to alter the security arrangements established under the 
protocols of Mutual Assistance on Non-Aggression and Defense endorsed in 1978 and 
1981 respectively, towards the one focused on intrastate conflicts.  The problem with this 
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arrangement that when a conflict remains purely internal, there was no plan of action 
taken by the ECOWAS community.  For ECOWAS to change it focus towards building 
mechanisms dealing strictly with intrastate conflict implied that members’ states were to 
be encouraged to use most of their non-existence resources in launching peacemaking 
intervention, thus opening themselves for future intervention because the lid of non-
intervention principles would have opened. Only the states with a significant resource 
power base as well as non-fearing attitude for a particular state in the sub-region would 
have welcomed such initiatives.  Therefore, in light of this observation it seems the 
security arrangement for getting involved in the intrastate conflict was left to Nigeria as a 
hegemon in the sub-region. 
This chapter will argue that Nigeria, the sub-regional hegemon is a key to 
understanding the ECOWAS peacemaking intervention in Liberia.60  The aim of this 
chapter is to show the critical role Nigerian leadership played in initiating an ECOWAS 
peacemaking intervention in Liberia, and to assess the relative importance of power, 
interest, international law, and morality behind that leadership. 
B.  BACKGROUND ON THE CONFLICT AND THE DECISION TO 
INTERVENE 
 
The origin of the Liberian crisis is best understood when traced from its entire 
historical background preferably starting from the early 1800s; however, for the purpose 
of this study a great deal of the history will not be considered.  This thesis will trace the 
origin of the conflict from the time when the late Master-Sergeant Samuel Doe was the 
President of Liberia. 
On Christmas eve of 1989 a civil war broke out in Liberia following a series of 
attacks on security posts on the border of Liberia and Ivory Coast by a band of armed 
men led by Charles Taylor in the of the previously unknown National Patriotic Front of 
Liberia (NPFL).  When the rebels of the NPFL attacked the villages of Butuo and 
Karnplay in Nimba County in northeastern Liberia “no one, least of all the Liberian 
government, considered them a serious political threat.”61  Reports state that the attack 
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resulted in a number of government officials and as many as 200 unarmed civilians being 
killed.62  In less than six months after the invasion, NPFL was in control of about 95 
percent of the country, leaving President Doe and his Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL) 
trapped in the executive mansion in Monrovia.63  With much of the government control 
in the hands of the rebels, there was a massive outflow of refugees into neighboring 
countries, especially Cote d’Ivoire, Guinea and Sierra Leone, and into more distant 
countries like Ghana and Nigeria.64  
 
The civil war was characterized by wide spread atrocities, human rights 
violations and sheer human misery on a scale never before witnessed in 
West Africa.  There was a total disregard for international conventions and 
civilized conduct of war by the government and rebel forces.65  
 
There was extensive recruitment of children as soldiers.  These child soldiers 
were encouraged to be cruel to unarmed civilians, especially women and children, by the 
rebel factions and the government of Liberia.  The killing of patients in hospitals, for 
instance, moved the Italian ambassador in Monrovia to make a passionate appeal to the 
United States to intervene and put an end to the carnage.  At about the same time, five 
other European ambassadors issued a statement that Liberia was sliding into “anarchy 
and national suicide.”66 
At the same time, an unparalleled outflow of refugees from Liberia was occurring.  
According to the 1992 report from the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 
(UNHCR), an estimated total of about 676.38067 were roaming the sub-region.68  Under 
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the auspices of the Standing Mediation Committee (SMC) which Nigerian leader, 
General Ibrahim Babangida proposed at the Banjul summit of ECOWAS in May 1990, 
ECOMOG was sent to Liberia on August 1990.  The intervention lasted until the end of 
1997 when the civil war formally came to an end.  About 200.000 died and 1.2 million 
people were displaced out of a pre-war population of only 2.5 million.  In October 1999 
there was the final withdrawal from Liberia of ECOMOG force.  Multiparty democratic 
elections were held in Liberia and Charles Taylor was formally inaugurated as the 
President.  However, the conflict itself exhibited all the manifestations of post cold-war 
intra-state conflict: state collapse; ethnic conflict; political fragmentation; warlordism; 
and a late and inadequate response from the UN.69  
C.  NIGERIAN HEGEMONIC ROLE IN THE ECOWAS DECISION TO 
INTERVENE: THE IMPORTANCE OF POWER 
 
Clement Adibe argues that Nigerian hegemony is the critical independent variable 
that supports the analysis of power as an essential element in the hegemon’s decision to 
intervene.70  The origin of Nigeria’s position in the ECOWAS community can be traced 
from the organization’s inception in 1975.  When ECOWAS was formed as an economic 
community despite the low level of trade, Cote D’Ivoire was the leading economic power 
of the four largest countries with others being Ghana, Nigeria and Senegal. At the 
formation of ECOWAS, Nigeria was thought to be the most likely hegemonic force in the 
sub-region; however, it was in the third position in terms of intra-regional trade.   
By the time the Liberian conflict culminated to a momentum that affected the 
whole sub-region the Nigerian state was clearly dominating according to economic and 
military capability.  Nigerian military expenditure was about US$ 1.080 million, which 
was about 2.5 percentage of GDP of about US$34.8 billion in 1999.  The total strength of 
the Nigerian military force was estimated to be 80.000 in 1999.  The nearest rival state 
was Cote d’Ivoire with a military expenditure of US$134 million, a 1.4 percentage of 
GDP of about US$11.098 billion, whereas the total military force estimated to be 8.100 
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in 1999.71  With such leading figures it was evident that Nigeria was a force to be 
considered within the West African region. 
Not only did Nigeria have significant military resources to contribute, but it also 
had regional and international influence.  Nigeria commanded considerable influence 
within the OAU, the UN and western capitals in comparison to other member states in the 
sub-region.  It was, thus, in a better position to attract foreign support and money for the 
ECOMOG operations.  Estimates are that Nigeria’s expenses for the operations were up 
to $4.5 billion dollars in the Liberian crisis.72  Putting into perspective the GDP’s of most 
states in the ECOWAS, clearly from this position, Nigeria was the only West African 
state with the resources to intervene in the Liberian conflict.73   
Nigerian policymakers realized that the proposal to intervene in the Liberian 
situation could create a dilemma of credibility, particularly, from the francophone 
countries.  The size and magnitude of the Nigerian state created a combination of fear and 
suspicion from the francophone countries, particularly from Cote d’Ivoire which is the 
stronger states in relation to Nigeria.  The fear and suspicion was exacerbated by the 
inability of Nigerian policymakers to provide a strong justification for their involvement 
in Liberian conflict.  The Nigerian involvement in Liberian conflict could not be justified 
in terms of its direct impact from the conflict.  The two francophone states, Cote d’Ivoire 
and Burkina Faso were in the forefront in terms of feeling the brunt of the Liberian 
conflict as opposed to Nigeria. Thus, these two states became the main supporters of the 
anti-Nigerian proposal of ECOMOG thus became the main backers of NPFL.   
The opposition from Cote d’Ivoire and Burkina Faso created a dilemma for 
Nigeria in its quest for hegemonic establishment in the sub-region.  Firstly, if Nigeria let 
the opposition from the francophone states to impede its primary intention, it will become 
evident from other states in the sub-region that Nigerian is incapable of assuming a 
leadership role.  Secondly, Nigeria realized that the stance taken by both Cote d’Ivoire 
and Burkina Faso to support Charles Taylor signified that they also have to support 
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Samuel Doe since he was already a legitimate leader of Liberia and that was certain to 
lend them credibility to their involvement.  The victory of Charles Taylor with the 
support of the two francophone states was going to put a question from other ECOWAS 
members’ states on the Nigeria’s ability to handle any sub-regional matters effectively, 
and thus undermine its hegemonic capability and ability. 
In order to avoid the stumbling blocks, Nigeria suddenly opted to create Standing 
Mediation Committee (SMC) to deal with any future conflict in the sub-region, starting 
with the Liberian conflict.  By creating such a committee, Nigeria knew that it can 
demonstrate its hegemonic position in the sub-region.  Nigerian leader, General 
Babangida called for the establishment of the SMC “to intervene in timely fashion, 
whenever, disputes arise in the sub-region.”74  The SMC was created to deal particularly 
with intrastate conflicts that were never catered by the conflict mechanism established in 
the ECOWAS.  Creating and establishing of SMC was a precedent move that shifted the 
responsibility of sub-regional security arrangement from ECOWAS Secretariat to the 
hegemony’s political leadership. The creation of the SMC was stressed by Nigerian 
President, Babangida that they were only “being our brothers’ keeper”.  The implication 
was that since the rest of the world had turned its back on Liberia in its darkest hour, it 
was left to Africans to come to their rescue.75 
The decision to launch a peacemaking military force by Nigeria while seeking 
support from the other states in the ECOWAS community did not follow a smooth path 
for the hegemon.  As expected, the proposal to form SMC was met with vehement 
resistance from Cote D’Ivoire and Burkina Faso.  These two Francophone states were not 
only in the forefront of opposing the SMC formation and ECOMOG creation, but the 
primary supporters of Charles Taylor.  However, their opposition to the Nigerian 
initiative was not sufficient to thwart its implementation because ECOWAS realized that 
the resources possessed by Nigeria were necessary to bring stability and peace in the sub-
region.  It was only the leaders of Cote d’Ivoire and Burkina Faso who were against 
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Nigeria’s proposal whereas other states were not prepared to take any stance in the 
debate. 
Nigeria managed to win support from some of the key state actors such as Ghana, 
Gambia, Guinea, Sierra Leone and Benin.  Of the five original member countries in 
ECOMOG, four were Anglophone and one Francophone.  President Soglo of Benin 
described the extent of the division in October 1992 by declaring that Nigeria’s intention 
to take over ECOMOG was because ECOWAS was too divided to have a common policy 
for a peaceful resolution was to the problem.76   The acceptance of the SMC by other 
states in the sub-region opened a means of creating ECOMOG, paving the way for 
Nigeria to stretch its hegemonic muscles in the sub-region.     
Despite the disputes among ECOWAS concerning the decision to intervene in 
Liberia, Nigeria’s participation was essential for launching the operation.  The fact that 
ECOWAS was an economic organization meant that it had no military resources at its 
disposal.  Additionally, at that time no other state in the ECOWAS was able to offer a 
package as significant as the one offered by Nigeria because many had not even paid 
their dues to ECOWAS for years.  Nigeria with the sub-region’s largest military was the 
only state in the sub-region to be able to contribute the bulk of equipment and supplies as 
well as troops.77  The resources supplied by Nigeria included tanks, artillery and air strike 
capability and 5.000 of the initial 11.000 troops.78  
Nevertheless, Nigeria became aware that unilateral action would be unacceptable 
to internal and international opinion, and would, in any case, reinforce the fear, implicit 
in intra-regional diplomacy, of its desire to use its hegemonic position to impose its will 
on smaller neighbors.  Thus, Nigeria opted to pursue its Liberian strategy through the 
framework of ECOWAS.79 
Ultimately, the leadership provided by Nigeria in terms of logistic, financial and 
troop support was able to sustain ECOMOG until the end of the conflict.  Nigeria’s 
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decision to launch peacemaking military intervention in Liberia was based on its ability 
to influence other member states in the sub-region and to support its command in 
overruling intended support from those states that were against its intentions.  Nigeria 
also received strong support and encouragement from the international community.   
The dominant position of Nigeria in West Africa enabled it to play a significant 
role in launching peacemaking intervention in Liberia.  Being the largest economic and 
military power in the sub-region, Nigeria realized that the situation in Liberia would in 
the long run impact it more negatively than other states because of its size and economic 
dependence on the stability and peace in the sub-region.  Also, the very position 
advantaged Nigeria to push its intention of establishing SMC and ECOMOG because it 
was able to lure other smaller states like Gambia and Togo to support its proposal.  
Gambia’s participation in the ECOMOG was motivated first, by its position as chair of 
ECOWAS and was expected to set a good example.  Second, it had close ties with 
Nigeria for many years, for example Abuja provided the Chief Judge of Banjul in the last 
fifteen or more years and senior military officers.  Togo opted to support Nigeria’s 
proposal once it realize that the bulk of the financial cost and troops was going to 
provided by Nigeria and the only thing from them was to show support.    
Again, since none of the other countries in the sub-region could effectively 
finance such force, Nigeria had to take the initiative if it was serious about making its 
dominance acknowledged within the sub-region and by the international community.  
Nevertheless, the opposition of other states towards Nigeria indicated that even though it 
had a significant command of economic and military leadership in West Africa, its 
dominance in the sub-region was not equally accepted by all the member states, 
particularly the Francophone states.  Thus, in order for Nigeria to play a hegemon, it had 
to shrug-off serious contention from other states that suspected its initiative as being an 
attempt to hijack the sub-region to further its parochial interests. 
The role played by Nigeria in the West African sub-region and its decision to 
intervene in Liberia is partly enough to sustain the realists’ hypothesis that sub-regional 
peacemaking intervention is more likely when a hegemonic power is militarily and 
economically formidable and lacks with regard to its position being acknowledged by 
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other states in the sub-region, whether explicitly or implicitly.  The limitation to this 
hypothesis is that Nigeria was never acknowledged by all the states in the sub-region to 
be an accepted leader that can easily solicit support within West Africa.  However, 
additionally this case makes clear that a hegemonic state within the sub-region must be 
prepared to ward-off some objections emanating from other states that may feel 
threatened by some of its particular actions. 
D.  THE ROLE OF INTEREST IN THE DECISION TO INTERVENE 
 
Nigerian involvement in ECOMOG is a prime example of a case where a 
combination of personal, economic and political interests motivated the hegemon to 
intervene in sub-regional conflicts.  In the assessment of whether interest played a 
significant role in the ECOWAS decision to intervene, not surprisingly; therefore, that 
self-regarding, other-regarding, collective and personal interest played a part in 
influencing the Nigerian decision to launch peacemaking intervention in Liberia.   
The self-regarding interests played a prominent role towards Nigeria’s motivation 
to intervene in Liberian conflict.  The main interest was based on the Nigerian 
government to create a leeway for hegemonic dominance in the sub-region.  Nigeria 
realized that the line of demarcation between the Anglophone and Francophone states had 
to be transcended before it can achieve its intended purpose of exerting political, military 
and economic dominance in the sub-region.  The decision of Babangida to first set up an 
SMC as a vehicle to launch ECOMOG under the auspices of Nigeria was a calculated 
strategy of enhancing Nigeria’s dominance in the sub-region.  Unfortunately, the 
Nigerian intentions were realized by Ivory Coast and Burkina Faso, who countered by 
forming anti-Nigerian proposals of the SMC.  They also argued strongly against 
Nigeria’s moot point of justifying their interest in Liberia as not being concerned with the 
stability and peace in the region but as a parochial interest driven by Nigeria’s wish to 
establish dominance in the sub-region because of its size.  In the same token, they further 
supported Charles Taylor against Doe who was primarily supported by Nigeria.  
Babangida provide Doe with a plane full of arms to combat Taylor and once it was 
evident that Doe was going to be defeated, he proposed an SMC to launch ECOMOG in 
Liberia to stop Taylor. 
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Nigeria knew that by allowing Taylor victory in Liberia its position in the sub-
region was going to be dented and as a result failed to achieve its intended purposes.  
This is indicated by the fact that even after the death of Doe, Nigeria maintained its 
opposition to Taylor assuming power in Liberia.  By allowing Taylor to take control in 
Liberia it would have signified to the francophone countries that Nigeria’s hegemon can 
be defeated, of which was what Nigeria wanted to avoid at all cost.  
Other-regarding interests which are not so strong to be labeled as the prime 
motivators for Nigeria’s involvement in Liberia, but also important to pay attention to, 
include the kidnapping, holding hostages, and killing of foreign citizens, especially from 
ECOWAS member states, which were reported to have reached a climax by the time 
ECOMOG was send to Liberia in August 1990.  At the same time over 3.000 foreign 
citizens were held by the NPFL alone, mainly Nigerians.  Reports are that “the citizens of 
Nigeria were specifically marked for elimination, thus NPFL vowed to kill a Nigerian for 
each Liberian killed by ECOMOG forces.”80  When information like that is received by a 
state, which the targeted members resided, the onus is on that state to do everything in its 
power to rescue them, and this was what was expected from Nigeria.  Attacks were also 
carried out against foreign embassies in Monrovia by the NPFL. For example the 
Nigerian Embassy was invaded at least twice.  The attack of its embassy, arrest and 
murder of citizens was seen by Nigeria as threats to international peace and security 
which was shouldered by Nigeria because of its economic dominance in region, and 
partly because it violated the diplomatic immunity of embassy buildings in international 
law. 
The moral pressure Nigeria felt coming from the international community 
propelled other regarding interest as part of Nigeria’s motivation.  As a hegemon, Nigeria 
was afraid that it could not defend an inactive position towards the carnage in Liberia 
when questioned by the international media, particularly knowing that ECOWAS had no 
resources to achieve to launch peacemaking intervention.  However, this kind of pressure 
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was not as explicit as the Nigerian intentions to establish the acknowledgement of its 
hegemonic dominance in the sub-region   
In addition, another argument advanced by Nigeria linked to collective interests 
was that the conflicts in Liberia posed a serious threat to its state and sub-regional 
security. This was mentioned because of the hegemonic position Nigeria occupies in the 
sub-region and the concern about the essentiality of peace and stability.  Despite the 
supposed hegemonic tendencies by Nigerians, a viable security regime in West Africa 
was not imposed by the sub-regional hegemon decision to intervene in the conflict of 
Liberia. The intervention occurred because of a convergence of interests shared by most 
member states to pursue common interest and circumvent certain outcomes relative to 
specific security preoccupation of ECOWAS. Viewed from this angle, the Nigeria 
interventions on behalf of the sub-regional community was an orchestrated by Babangida 
personal staff to cloak his personal interest in the issue of Liberia. 
As for collective interest, one major factor that led Nigeria to contemplate 
intervention in the Liberian crisis was the fear that the civil war, if not contained, may 
spill into the neighboring countries with very dangerous security and defense 
implications for the West African sub-region. Along with this fear, the stability of sub-
region was threatened by the influx of thousands of refugees fleeing from Liberia into 
other states.  However, this reason was clouded by the argument that ECOMOG forces 
consisted about three quarters of Nigerian men, so the financial burden of the operation 
was shouldered by Nigeria.  In spite of the fact that the force was established by 
ECOWAS, the general public perception was that ECOMOG is a Nigerian force.81 
There is link between Nigeria’s intervention in Liberia and its leader’s personal 
friendship to Samuel Doe.  As reported by Sesay, 
 
General Babangida was known to be a close friend of Samuel Doe and his 
government.  For instance, it was disclosed that Babangida bought 
Liberia’s $30 million loan with the African Development Bank (AfDB) 
for reasons that have been made known to the Nigerian public.  When Doe 
wanted to pursue postgraduate studies in political science in Liberia, he 
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convinced the Nigerian president to finance the establishment of a 
Graduate School of International Affairs to the tune of $8 million.”  
Adding to that some “Nigerian professors were seconded to the school and 
were paid in US dollars by the Nigerian government.82   
 
Liberia even named the institution as the Babangida School of International 
Diplomacy.  Many Nigerians, particularly the informed ones, believed that their president 
had a hidden agenda in Liberia because he was not transparent about his motivations. 
They friendship of Babangida and Doe did not make Nigeria’s justification for 
involvement in Liberia easy because many believed that the peacemaking intervention by 
Nigeria under the auspices of ECOMOG was just a ploy to save his friend Doe.  The 
other factor is that the intervention in Liberia was the result of Babangida’s fixation of 
establishing himself as the political power broker in the sub-region.  Moreover, 
Babangida’s intervention in Liberia was admiration of how Doe successfully transmuted 
from a military to a civilian president in 1985; therefore Babangida had a similar 
ambition and agenda in Nigeria.83  This point is sustained because of Babangida previous 
reluctance to hand over power to civilian leadership and his delay to hold election in 
Nigeria until his demise by Sani Abacha. 
The Nigerian SMC proposal to launch ECOMOG was also linked to Doe’s visit to 
Nigeria in May 1990, which led to media reports that Doe had been given a plane load of 
arms to bolster his war efforts against Taylor.  This action by Babangida was an 
indication that Nigeria wanted Doe to prevail in Liberia and wanted the demise of Taylor.  
This caused the two-francophone states (Cote d’Ivoire and Burkina Faso) to support 
Taylor.  However, the Liberian leader denied any connection between the war and 
mentioned that the trip was basically to “show our solidarity with Nigerian leader in the 
wake of the abortive coup against him, and to reassure President Babangida of our 
support, and to encourage him to continue to do the good work for our people and lay a 
solid foundation to democracy in Africa.”84 Babangida also issued a statement that 
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explained his position about the visit of Doe. In his justification, he said “there was 
nothing wrong in lending an ear to a brother in distress that did not signify 
acquiescence.”85 
The Nigerian leader initiative of forming the SMC was mainly ascribed to 
Babangida’s friendship to Samuel Doe of Liberia.  The proposal of Nigeria formation of 
the SMC came right after it was realized that Doe would not be able to contain or defeat 
Taylor and this was quickly realized by the leaders of Cote d’Ivoire and Burkina Faso 
who opted to support Taylor.  Therefore any initiative by Babangida on behalf of Nigeria 
was seen as defending Doe’s interest.   Nigerian President argued that the conflict in 
Liberia posed a serious threat to his state and sub-regional security86, supported Kieh and 
Riley arguments that Nigeria under President Babangida decided to participate in 
ECOMOG in order to maintain Nigeria’s hegemony and to strengthen its international 
image.87  By participating in ECOMOG, Nigeria would be able to maintain its hegemonic 
image without losing legitimacy for involving itself in another state’s affairs.  Moreover, 
by recruiting other smaller states in the sub-region to join it in the peacemaking 
operation, Nigeria could enhance its image as an expanding hegemon and its reputation 
as a cooperative sub-regional power.88  This effort by Nigeria was an effort to gain 
legitimacy of its intention to launch peacemaking intervention in Liberia. 
Judging from the above discussion of the role of interest in Nigerian intervention 
in Liberia, it appears that the personal interests of the leaders combined with self-
regarding interests, principally constitute the Nigerian intervention, while the remaining 
portion concern stems for the lives of expatriates and altruistic reasons.  The hypothesis 
that sub-regional peacemaking is more likely when the interests of the hegemon are at 
stake is sufficiently supported by the evidence provided above. 
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E.  THE QUESTION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW  
 
Peacemaking intervention in Liberia happened at the same time as changes in the 
international community’s attitude towards the African conflicts related to the post-Cold 
War environment.  When thousands of people were dying, most of whom were civilians, 
and hundreds of thousands of others turning into refugees, no organizations were willing 
to intercede or take action including the OAU, which “merely dusted up its articles on 
non-interference in the internal affairs of member-states.”89  Nevertheless, when Nigeria 
started to take matters in its hands, the OUA under the chairmanship of Ugandan 
President Moseveni, supported ECOWAS efforts to promote peace in West Africa in line 
with the administration of sub-regional initiatives, as an appropriate first line of action.90 
From the international perspective, the then UN Secretary General, Javier Perez 
de Cuellar, categorically stated that the UN would not intervene, while the US, even 
though it had about 2000 Marines stationed off the coast of Liberia, refused to move in 
and separate the warring factions.  “Meanwhile, as the world looked on and passed the 
buck more and more Liberians were dying and starving.”91  The international community 
showed little interest in resolving the conflict in Liberia.  However, at was later within 
the peacemaking intervention that the UN officially mandated ECOMOG’s actions under 
chapter VIII of its charter in October 1992.92 
The choice was then upon the members of ECOWAS who were faced with 
thousands of refugees crossing the borders and with increasing regional instability as 
other rebel forces were aroused, to take.  Since ECOWAS, was primarily concerned with 
economic and developmental matters in the sub-region, it lacked the capacity to assume 
responsibility for mutual security.93  Nigeria, as the sub-regional hegemon, took a leading 
                                                 
89 Akabogu, C., “ECOWAS Takes Initiative” in Vogt, M.A, op cit, p 73 
90 Sams, K. and Berman E., “Peacekeeping in Africa: Capabilities and Culpabilities” United Nations 
Publication, (UNIDIR/ 2000/3), p 100 
91 Akabogu, p 74 
92 Tuck, C., “Every Car or Moving Object Gone: The ECOMOG Intervention in Liberia” African 
Studies Quarterly, Vol 4, No 1 [http://web.africa.ufl.edu/asq/v4/v4i1a1.htm], p 4 
93 Adisa, J., “The Politics of Regional Military Cooperation: The Case of ECOMOG” in Vogt, M.A. 
op cit, p 213 
46 
role in this effort, committing troops and supplies to the operation and communicating the 
purpose of the operation.  Nigeria, expectedly, turned out to be the unofficial 
spokesperson for ECOWAS, and put forward a variety of explanations to justify the 
operations in Liberia.94    
The decision to deploy ECOMOG was contrary to article 3, section 2 of the OAU 
Charter and the corresponding articles of the UN which expressly forbid interference in 
the domestic affairs of members states, and it also violated the 1978 ECOWAS Protocol 
on Non Aggression especially article 2 which demands that each member state shall 
refrain from committing, encouraging or condoning acts of subversion, hostility or 
aggression against the territorial integrity or political independence of other member 
states.95  It was also clear from the members of the ECOWAS that no economic 
prosperity and development can be attained in a volatile environment such as the one 
propelled by Liberian civil war.  The question that arises is thus how ECOWAS and 
Nigeria dealt with the issue of international mandate particularly with the absence of 
international community interest in Liberia? 
The decision taken at Freetown, Sierra Leone, in July 1990, by the then newly 
inaugurated ECOWAS Standing Mediation Committee (SMC), to deploy a Monitoring 
Group (ECOMOG) into Liberia was the result of an ongoing debate and controversy in 
the sub-region.96  The debate dates back from the time when Ghanaian President, Dr 
Kwame Nkuruma argue for the formation of an African High Command, which was to be 
a military arm of an African Union Government to facilitate new and strong linkages 
between the African states.  In ECOWAS, some heads of states believed that Liberia 
presented the sub-regional organization with the challenge of initiative in taking the 
appropriate decision to salvage the country from disintegration, while others suspected 
that Nigeria wants to utilize the opportunity presented by the carnage in Liberia to push 
its hegemonic agenda. 
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The debate was about whether to launch a peacemaking intervention involved 
considerable animosity among member states in the sub-region.  The eruption of the 
Liberian crisis in 1989 served as a catalyst to highlight the differences among the member 
states within the ECOWAS community or to encourage the member states to establish a 
mechanism to work together towards the peace and stability essential for prosperity in the 
sub-region.   
According to Sesay, there were “two foundations on which the ECOWAS legal 
argument stood.”  The two are the 1981 Protocol on Mutual Assistance on Matters of 
Defense (MAD) and a letter from Doe to ECOWAS through the Nigerian intervention.97  
The main concern of the MAD document was the unjustifiable destruction of human life 
and property and the displacement of persons.  Based on the MAD, legal justifications for 
intervention included the various forms of massive damage inflicted by the armed 
conflict on the stability and survival of the entire Liberian nation; concern about the 
plight of foreign nations, particularly citizens of the community who are seriously 
affected by the conflict; the fact that law and order in Liberia had broken down; and 
lastly, a peaceful and lasting solution to the conflict ending the situation which seriously 
disrupted the normal life of innocent citizens in Liberia.98 
However, even though the MAD provided the necessary reasons for preparing to 
send the ECOMOG force in Liberia, ECOWAS could not expeditiously deal with the 
Liberian conflict because of its domestic nature.  The main reason for this problem is that 
ECOWAS conflict resolution mechanisms are designed for interstate conflicts within the 
region and not intrastate ones.  This also created a problem in the procedure that has to be 
followed when discharging the MAD protocol.  ECOWAS proposed that three organs be 
put in place before the final acceptance of being involved in internal conflicts.  These 
were: Defense Council, Defense Commission and Allied Armed Forces Council 
(AAFC).99  However, “none of these structures were in place, a potential signal that the 
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community was not ready for a military role in Nigeria.”100  Therefore, the peacemaking 
intervention in Liberia could not have been justified within the context of the ECOWAS 
treaty or MAD protocol because the proposed procedures were not adhered to stringently. 
The letter from Doe emanated from the professed view that a sub-regional 
organization is entitled to mount peacemaking intervention in the matters of another state 
if it received a request from the government of the state in conflict.  Article 16 of the 
MAD protocol provides that “in case of armed threat or aggression” directed against a 
member state the Authority shall, on receipt of a written request submitted to the current 
chairperson, with copies to other members, decide on the expediency of military action in 
relation to the provision of article 6. “The exception to this aspect of the principle of non-
intervention would be when the intervention is carried out at the request of a sovereign 
government”.101  Kofour claims that Doe letter read “It would seem expedient to 
introduce an ECOWAS peacekeeping force into Liberia to forestall increasing terror and 
tension and to ensure a peaceful transitional environment.”102 
Since the letter was sent to the Nigerian government to be presented to the 
ECOWAS community, some officials not surprisingly have complained that they never 
saw or were informed about such correspondence.  The other issue is that even “if it 
insinuated that Doe desired military assistance, the issue of his effective control over 
Liberia and hence the legal validity of any such alleged request is called into 
question.”103  This argument is supported by the observation that at that time the NPFL 
had gained control of over 90 percent of Liberian territory with Doe’s administration 
being under siege.  Doe’s effective control over Liberia was non-existent and, 
accordingly, his ability to function as a government in the strict sense is a moot point.104  
Nevertheless, according to legal precepts Doe was still the internationally recognized 
sovereign ruler of Liberia.  
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From the discussion above a central point has to be addressed and has bearing on 
the “non-interference clause” and the MAD protocol.  To what extent can the Liberian 
crisis be regarded as internal when it placed a heavy refugee burden on neighboring 
states?  Samuel Doe’s request together with the acknowledgement, particularly by 
Nigeria, that a state of anarchy and total breakdown of law and order in Liberia led to the 
decision to set aside the sovereignty claim and non-interference principle.  The fact was 
no longer resulted in the contending factions holding the entire population as hostage, 
depriving them food, health facilities and other basic necessities of life. The intervention 
undertaken in Liberia does not support the globalists’ hypothesis that sub-regional 
peacemaking is more likely when the sub-regional organizations’ assessment of the 
conflict situation is viewed as transcending sovereignty claims and leading to 
unacceptable humanitarian sufferings.  The request of Doe routed through Nigeria served 
the primary purpose of the incumbent government because it was through that they were 
able to justify their involvement in the Liberian crisis.    
F. MORALITY QUESTION 
 
The then Nigerian president, Ibrahim Babangida, provided a strong moral 
justification for the Liberian operation on behalf of ECOWAS and Nigeria.  In a speech 
in Lagos, he focused primarily on humanitarian considerations: 
 
…we are in Liberia because events in that country have led to the massive 
destruction of property by all the parties, the massacre by all parties of 
thousand of innocent civilians including foreign nationals, women and 
children some of whom had sought sanctuary in the churches, mosques, 
diplomatic missions, hospitals and Red Cross protection, contrary to all 
recognized civilized behavior… I ask, should Nigeria and other 
responsible countries in the sub-region stand and watch the whole of 
Liberia turned into one mass graveyard?...we also know that there are 
those who are waiting to see the Liberian crisis as a concrete indicator of 
Africa in disarray and despair, purposeless and without any direction or 
control…in Liberia, we are first and foremost reflecting the love we have 
for our respective countries, our sub-region, Africa, the black world, and 
mankind… If the 1990s… demand a redefinition of what constitutes 
national security, does the Nigerian position in the West African sub-
region also entail certain specific roles and responsibilities?  
Consequently, the reasons for our presence in Liberia are not mysterious.  
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They are simply our national obligations voluntary contracted…or would 
the position of ECOWAS be more noble and much better understood if 
because one faction refused to cooperate…we had abandoned Liberians to 
fate?105  
 
From this speech a few issues actually explained the moral element which initially 
emphasized the expected role of ECOWAS as a sub-regional organization when 
humanitarian concerns supersede the sovereignty claim of a state in civil conflict.  The 
argument here is that ECOWAS has a moral obligation when it comes to the events in 
Liberia.  The surprising part is when the moral obligation of ECOWAS was to come from 
Nigeria’s President rather than from the Secretariat of ECOWAS.  This explains that 
Nigeria attempted to use any avenue to hide its real intentions and the reason for 
launching peacemaking intervention in Liberia.  Another point about moral obligation is 
that it is usually not enough by itself to ensure a launch of peacemaking intervention, but 
when is supported by contribution of the required resources it can be easily sustained as a 
motivation that cloaks self-regarding interests.  This is where the role of a sub-regional 
hegemon, Nigeria comes into play.  The moral obligation made Nigeria the latitude to 
launch peacemaking intervention in Liberia and in itself brought two important elements 
in the sub-regional efforts.  In the case of Liberia, this moral obligation enabled Nigeria 
to hide behind moral arguments because of its possession as well as equipped with the 
necessary coercive military force. 
Another point, which emanates from the above speech, is acknowledgement of 
Nigeria that as a hegemon, the onus is on them to prove their worth in the sub-region to 
the international community.  This implies that even though the moral obligation is 
mostly placed on the shoulders of ECOWAS, obviously required resources to deal with 
the conflict.  The next step is the international community is expectation that the most 
powerful state in the sub-region, in this case Nigeria, would act to enhance the objectives 
of the sub-regional organization.  Thus, Nigerian leader realized that moral obligation is 
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not only a driving force that can actively insure Nigeria’s lead role but also an important 
element for Nigeria’s own interest. 
The Nigerian leader returned to this theme in another famous speech in 1992.  On 
that occasion, he argued that: 
 
While Nigeria respects the principle of non-interference in the affairs of a 
member state, we believed very strongly that the crisis in Liberia, the 
oldest independent country in West Africa, demanded the attention of 
ECOWAS.  This was because the killings were getting out of hand as 
there was no longer a credible authority to establish order in the 
country.106  
 
The Nigerian position was supported, rather surprisingly, by the chairperson of 
the OAU, Uganda’s Yoweri Museveni, who apparently set aside one of the most revered 
concepts in inter-African relations: non-interference in the internal affairs of one 
another.107 
The emphasis on the severity of killings and refugee problems stemmed from both 
Nigerian as well as the other members of the ECOWAS who feared the effects of 
spillover from the Liberian conflicts.  The argument is that a country like Nigeria when 
faced with a problem in the region that threatens the peace or stability of a member 
country, and could spread to others, should act to eliminate the threat of refugee problem.  
If Nigeria could not stop the threat, the region could be ablaze with instability.108   
However, there are some reasons to be suspicious about the claims that the 
problem of refugees was the issue which set in motion the Nigerian decision to undertake 
peacemaking intervention.  According to the 1992 report from the total estimated total of 
about 676.380, only 3.000 in Nigeria.109  From this report Nigeria apparently experienced 
almost the least number of refugees as opposed to the neighboring countries like Cote 
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d’Ivoire or Burkina Faso.  In addition, one should ask why Nigeria should play the role of 
prime mover in initiating a peacemaking intervention while some Liberia’s more 
immediate neighbors, who as a result of geographical proximity were directly threatened 
and impacted, did not contribute much, and some remained hostile to the concept of 
ECOMOG and refused to work within the SMC.110  
The answer to this question is found in the assessment of position of Nigeria in 
the sub-region, which relate to the moral responsibility when possessing the means to act 
when required by humanitarian principles.  The international community also expected 
Nigeria to show its concern with the stability and peace and the region by acting 
decisively when mandated by moral decay in the sub-region.  Being the largest industrial 
and economic power in the sub-region, it is expected from Nigeria to utilize such 
resources when humanitarian carnage is dominant in the sub-region.  However, judging 
from the numbers of refugees, as a result of the conflicts in Liberia was enough to 
warrant ECOWAS to be concern with the stability and peace in the sub-region.  The 
concern will not have been enough to stop the carnage but action which Nigeria 
responded positively to that regard.     
Although the globalists’ hypothesis that sub-regional peacemaking intervention is 
more likely when humanitarian carnage exists in the sub-region can supported by the 
significant number of refugees in the sub-region, as a reason for why Nigeria was so fired 
up to deal with the conflict in Liberia this hypothesis cannot be sustained because Nigeria 
experienced less impact than other states in the sub-region.  It could be easily argued that 





The position, in which ECOWAS found itself with regard to the conflicts in 
Liberia, was a clear case that indicated the limits of sub-regional organizations in dealing 
with peacemaking intervention.  The most obvious limit was the inability of the 
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ECOWAS to develop a conflict resolution mechanism to manage intrastate conflicts 
because of its focus on ensuring non-interference in the sovereignty of other member 
states.  The emergence of civil conflict in Liberia dictated that the choice before 
ECOWAS was either to accept Nigerian dominance of ECOMOG or accept Liberia’s 
disintegration.  Stopping the carnage in Liberia required that a significant resource be 
utilized to overcome the power of the rebel groups who possessed major arsenals.  
Nigeria was the state possessing such resources and it was willing to use them to its own 
advantage.  The initiatives taken by Nigeria were clouded by its interest as the motivating 
factor in the decision to intervene.  The personal interest of Babangida was a major 
reason to intervene in Liberia; however, this is was not surprising because personal rule is 
part of the game in African politics.  Doe’s request for assistance from ECOWAS 
through Nigeria served to support the personal interest of Babangida.   
On the international law aspect, the ECOMOG force was largely accepted by the 
international community because of its reluctance to get physically involved in 
peacemaking effort, and it knowledge that supporting ECOWAS mandate would ensure 
Nigeria’s resources being used.  The humanitarian carnage in Liberia was definitely 
appalling and, thus, required some form of action from within the ECOWAS states.  The 
role of ECOWAS and Nigeria in deciding to mount peacemaking intervention in Liberia 
facilitated the argument that the realists’ element of power and interest contributed to the 
overall decision.  However, there is one crucial observation that emanated from this case: 
a sub-regional hegemon is capable of unleashing peacemaking intervention in the sub-
region even if its leadership role is not equally acknowledged by member-states, provided 
it has a formidable economic and military power that can be utilized to ward off such 
challenges.  In addition, this case has indicated that the mandate from sub-regional 
organizations matters because Nigeria strived to obtain ECOWAS mandate before 
intervening in Liberia.  As the hegemon and containing the significant resources needed 
by a sub-regional organization enhanced the provision of a legal standing, because 
without the through contribution of the hegemon there will be no possibility of 
peacemaking intervention, which is viewed by all in the sub-region to be essential for 
stability and development. 
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IV.  CENTRAL AFRICAN MILITARY INTERVENTIONS IN THE 
1990S: THE CASE OF THE DRC 
A.  INTRODUCTION 
 
The Central African region, also known as the Great Lakes Region, is made-up of 
Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi, Tanzania, and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC- 
formerly known as Zaire).  These states’ relations are somewhat unstable, mainly due to 
the ethnic make-up in the sub-region.  Mathee mentions that the Tutsi and Hutu 
animosities in the sub-region had a spillover effect, which was dominating, in the entire 
region.111  However, this is not the place to account for all the turmoil in the Great Lakes 
Region.  The focus here is on the crisis in the DRC. 
In 1998 about thousands of fighters from at eight African states and several rebel 
groups were involved in a war in the DRC.  This chapter investigates how the 
development of this war has impacted the peacemaking initiatives in the African 
continent, by looking at the case from several perspectives.  It will examine the conflict 
from the time when Laurent Kabila ascended the presidential throne because this is era 
where the efforts of peacemaking military intervention started to be visible to the 
international community at large. 
The element of power differs from the previous case due to the absence of a 
formidable sub-regional organization, which comprise of a clear-cut hegemonic state 
within the sub-region.  The question of a hegemon will be looked at, from two 
perspectives.  The first will be based on the argument that no state is recognized within 
the sub-region as a natural power.  The second will be based on the acknowledgment that 
the DRC is part of the Southern African Development Community (SADC), from which 
South Africa is a recognized hegemon; however, its manner of its involvement will be a 
topic of discussion.  Thus, this chapter will argue that the absence of a clear-cut hegemon 
in the sub-region has affected the way things have developed in the sub-region. 
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B. BRIEF BACKGROUND ON THE CONFLICT AND DECISIONS TO 
INTERVENE 
 
The immediate setting of the conflict in the DRC is the 1994 genocide of 
moderate Tutsi by Hutus in Rwanda.  The Tutsi-led Rwandan Patriotic Front over-ran 
Rwandan territory and its government later that year.  The Hutu refugees, fearing 
retribution, fled to camps in eastern Zaire, where the president, Mobutu Sese Seko, 
allowed the Hutu Interahamwe militia, responsible for the genocide, to regroup under the 
cover of the refugee camps.112  Mobutu’s actions of not doing anything to stop the 
militias from regrouping angered the rulers of Rwanda and ultimately led the new 
Patriotic Front government to provide military backing to rebel groups in eastern Zaire 
seeking to overthrow the Mobutu regime. 
At the same time, the Ugandan government of Yoweri Museveni was fighting 
against the insurgent groups supported by Sudan and operating from DRC,113 while the 
Angolan government complained about UNITA using Zaire territory as their hiding 
territory. Mobutu and his government ignored protests from these other governments.  
Kabila and his rebel group, the Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of 
Congo-Zaire (AFDL), were the most prominent players in the struggle to overthrow 
Mobutu and had conducted sporadic campaigns since the 1960s.  This shared interest 
among those who complained about Mobutu got them together, and these allies 
succeeded in ending Mobutu’s 30 years of rule in the DRC. 
From this strong alliance, Kabila assumed power in May 1997; however, this was 
short lived because he soon lost credibility with those who brought him to power. 
“Initially the support of the Ugandan and Rwandan governments acted as a security net 
for the Kabila government with its small power base in Zaire’s capital, Kinshasa.”114  
Both Uganda and Rwanda started to switch allegiance while starting to support rebels 
opposed to Kabila. 
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Uganda and Rwanda helped Kabila because they wanted to secure their borders 
against rebel attacks.  Rwanda refused to adhere to Kabila’s demands of removing the 
Rwandan forces from DRC because the Interahamwe continued to use eastern DRC as a 
base.  Furthermore, Rwanda claimed that Kabila was supporting the rebels to attack 
Rwanda, Kabila vehemently denied.  As for Uganda, President Museveni was mainly 
concerned about dissidents using northern DRC as a base from which to launch attacks 
against his government.  He also reportedly made the Congo a personal campaign on 
which he could manifest his self-justified position as a sub-regional leader.115 
The Rwandese and Ugandan governments’ resentments against Kabila again led 
the governments to join hands in assisting rebel forces against the AFDL forces.  Thus, 
Rwanda opted to support the rebel factions in Goma, while Uganda backed the faction 
based in Kisangani.  These actions from the two DRC neighbors gave the rebel forces an 
edge over Kabila’s forces, which ultimately led to Kabila controlling at best one half of 
the country, from the equatorial region in the northwest to mineral-rich Katanga.  The 
rebels controlled the other half of the country while rapidly advancing towards Kabila’s 
territory.116 
By July 1998, rumors in Kinshasa implied an invasion by the armies of Rwanda 
and Uganda, and the same time, cross-border movements of their forces increased.117  
Faced with the prospect of being overthrown by the rebel forces, Kabila formally 
appealed to the SADC for help.  Kabila joined SADC in 1997 after his case was 
supported by the former South African President, Nelson Mandela who, at the time, was 
also the chief mediator between Mobutu and Kabila.  Mandela cited the significance of 
DRC in the region and its willingness to contribute to developing Africa’s economic and 
political position in the international system.  However, for Kabila, the reason to join 
SADC in 1998 was originally to offset the power of Rwanda and Uganda in Central 
Africa and at the same time to have a legitimate appeal of assistance from his friends 
down South. 
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Kabila’s request was recognized by Zimbabwe, Angola and Namibia who citied 
the violation of international law by Uganda and Rwanda as their justification to 
intervene.  Zimbabwe sent in its highly trained and well-equipped troops to quickly 
occupy the Mbuyi-Mayi region, forcing Rwanda to back away from its initial intentions. 
Angolan troops occupied the southwest region, thereby securing the DRC’s access to the 
sea.  The deployment of Namibian troops was mainly intended to support Angolan forces 
to root out UNITA forces not to enter of borders. 
Two reasons exist for Kabila opting to request external intervention from the 
SADC.  Firstly, the absence of a recognized sub-regional body in Central Africa dictated 
that in order for Kabila to feel secure from other states in the sub-region, SADC 
membership was the logical answer.  Secondly, Kabila knew that his request for joining 
SADC would not strongly be opposed by states in the SADC because of their stakes in 
the DRC.  He also knew that for the assistance of those who have interests to be 
forthcoming, he should route his request through the SADC because by then Zimbabwe 
President Robert Mugabe was the Chairperson of SADC and would endorse his request.  
Mugabe waited for the opportune moment to announce Kabila’s request. 
On August 7, President Mogabe, who was then a chairperson of SADC then, 
convened a summit at the Victoria Falls to discuss Kabila’s request and the Congo 
crisis.118  What was surprising was that all the presidents of the member states were 
invited to accept for South Africa, the hegemon in the sub-region.  It can be argued that 
Mogabe’s actions confirmed the reports that he took the DRC’s request as an opportunity 
to assert his leadership in the sub-region which was vanishing and being replaced by 
Nelson Mandela of South Africa.  However, not much came out of the summit; perhaps 
Mogabe was using it as a testing ground for his authority. 
The absence of South Africa in one of the crucial meetings, organized by Mugabe 
deliberately to isolate the hegemon, resulted in the decision to provide military support to 
the DRC.119  Mugabe knew that including South Africa in the meeting would jeopardize 
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his intention of intervening militarily in the DRC.  This is what Mugabe and his allies 
feared to take place, and isolating South Africa was seen to be a calculated strategy.   
Indeed, South Africa objected to the intervention in the DRC by other SADC 
member states, claiming that it was not the right approach to dealing with the conflict in 
the sub-region.  South Africa opposed the decision made by SADC to intervene in the 
DRC, but did the majority of SADC membership support military intervention in the 
DRC?  As far as other member states in the SADC were concerned with the intervention 
in the DRC, silence was the response from all of them, which led to the complication of 
whether SADC as an organization supports the intervention in the DRC.  This ultimately 
leads to the question of why South Africa, as a hegemon, did not launch a peacemaking 
intervention in the DRC. 
Firstly, at the time of the turmoil in the DRC, South Africa was still trying to 
understand the politics of the sub-region from its long absence in the affairs of the SADC.  
Even though it possessed all the necessary resources appropriate for peacemaking 
intervention, other member states judged with suspicion because of its past involvement 
in the sub-region.  Therefore, the question arises as to why South Africa should provide 
the resources to intervene in the DRC when it does not have any control over the use of 
resources.  Secondly, unlike other SADC states that intervened in the DRC, South Africa 
did not have any particular interest besides an altruistic wish of seeing an end to the 
conflict in the sub-region. 
Thirdly, the factor of distance also contributed to a non-intervention posture of 
South Africa in the DRC.  The DRC is located far away from South Africa and as a result 
a conflict in Central Africa has no practical damage to the interest of South Africa.  
Committing troops to such a far-off state therefore, was not going to play well for the 
South African government recently elected, that needed to establish credibility in its 
domestic sphere rather than in the international one.  Lastly, since peacemaking 
intervention required a deployment of military forces, capable of handling such a 
situation, this issue played on the side of South Africa negatively.  South Africa was, at 
that moment, busy with the integration and transformation of its forces, which did not 
have any peace support operation experiences at hand. To avoid embarrassment, a useful 
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route for South Africa to take was of mediation in the DRC.  Nevertheless, in a complete 
turn around in September 1998 at a mini SADC summit in Durban, the South African 
government announced that the intervention was reasonable because the DRC had been 
invaded, but South Africa announced that it would not send troops itself.120  This sudden 
change of heart by South Africa was compelled by its intention to do the same in Lesotho 
later the very same month.  South African government knew about their intention to 
going in Lesotho in advance because as soon as they changed their stance towards the 
interventions in the DRC, both Mandela and his deputy, Thabo Mbeki left for overseas 
living the Minister of Home Affairs, Mangosuthu Buthelezi to act the President.  Thus, 
interest was the cause for South Africa to support DRC external intervention. 
From this case, two findings emerged from the element of hegemonic power in 
the sub-region.  First, the absence of a hegemon in the sub-region does not prevent the 
occurrence of military intervention, but it certainly affects the nature of such intervention.  
The interventions in the DRC could not be labeled as peacemaking because there were 
more parochial concerns from those who intervened in the DRC than finding a peaceful 
resolution to the civil war. 
Second, the absence of a hegemon contributes to non-coherence in the nature of 
interventions in a conflict-prone state; as a result, a vacuum of command and control 
exists with no state being willing to shoulder such a responsibility.  This stems from fear 
of upsetting other states, which can easily declare war.  In contrast, a hegemon is able to 
decide on which course of action to take without fear of retribution from the other states. 
The realist hypothesis that sub-regional peacemaking intervention is more likely 
when a hegemonic power is economically formidable and its position is acknowledged by 
other states in the region, whether explicitly or implicitly, is sustained in this case.  
Clearly, in this case the absence and non-participation of a hegemonic state in the DRC 
conflict resulted in a typical traditional military intervention where states intervene to 
further protect their own interests.  Although, Mugabe played a role in insuring that the 
hegemonic power of South Africa was kept out, South Africa itself was not practically 
interested in the matters of the DRC.  
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C. VARIOUS INTERESTS OF THE INTERVENERS 
 
Their national interests as well as some leaders personal interests influenced the 
involvement of several African states in the DRC conflict.  This development was 
prompted by the non-participation of a rightful sub-regional hegemon in the crisis of the 
DRC.  Although a number of South African firms were mentioned in the UN report, this 
was a private business, which had no connection to the South African government, thus 
collective interest was the only driving force behind South Africa’s involvement in the 
DRC.  The leadership of South Africa has consistently indicated that stability and peace 
in the Great Lakes region was valuable to the African continent because of its locality 
and the interest of many states in that region.  This became evident when Nelson Mandela 
voluntarily mediated between Kabila and Mobutu in 1996 and later called for 
incorporating the DRC into SADC.  The route taken by South Africa with regard to the 
DRC conflict confirmed the realist hypothesis that a sub-regional peacemaking 
intervention is more likely when the self-regarding interests of the hegemon are at stake. 
The attitude of South Africa in the DRC conflict opened a floodgate of interventions 
propelled by the self interests of several states that had high stakes in the Central African 
region, particularly in the DRC. 
In the case of Zimbabwe, the element of self-regarding interest and especially 
personal interest dominated their decision to intervene militarily.  The position of 
Zimbabwe was motivated by concern of repayment in the event of Kabila’s overthrow 
because the DRC owed a war debt of several million dollars.  The business interests of 
some of President Mugabe’s associates and senior officers were at risk also.121  Even 
before the intervention in 1998, Mugabe had provided support to Kabila in his campaign 
against Mobutu.  He had, for example, donated 5 million US dollars in 1996 to the cause 
in exchange for contracts.122 
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When Zimbabwe government announced its decision to intervene in the DRC it 
was met with criticism by both the public and international donors because of its shaky 
financial situation and the obvious expenses that would be incurred in such operations. 
The government justified its action by arguing that the intervention would be financed 
through contracts that the Kabila government had promised to the Zimbabwe Defense 
Industry and by Kabila granting mining concessions to Zimbabwean interests.  However, 
these arrangements were already in place long before the decision to intervene, and 
actually provided the motivation for decision to intervene.  In early 1997, for instance, a 
deal worth 53 million US dollars was reached between the Zimbabwe Defense Industry 
and Kabila to supply his forces with food, uniforms, and weaponry.123 
As for personal interest, the search for private economic gain on the part of 
Mugabe’s cronies and the military leadership,124 who has a personal stake in the DRC’s 
rich mineral wealth and are on the boards of directors of mining companies.125  It did not 
come as a surprise that Zimbabwe’s troops were stationed in southeast DRC (Katanga), 
where large mineral deposits, including diamonds, are situated.  As additionally reported 
the commander of the Zimbabwe Defense Forces, Lieutenant General Vitalis Zninavashe, 
the director of the Osleg (Pvt) Ltd, joint venture with Comiex-Congo Sarl, in which 
senior members of the DRC government had interests.126  Without a doubt the issue of 
personal interest has contributed to a large extent towards motivating Mugabe and his 
circle to encourage intervention in the DRC. 
The other reason motivating Mugabe to intervene in the DRC, treated by many as 
a secondary issue, is his concern about the diminishing leadership role plays in the sub-
region since the admittance of South Africa in the SADC.  Prior to the admittance of 
South Africa in the SADC, Zimbabwe was largely playing a leadership role in the sub-
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region, which was then abolished when South Africa became official part of SADC.  The 
DRC’s request gave Mugabe an opportunity to assert his leadership in the sub-region 
allowing him to exploit the institutional advantage by his long membership in SADC.  
Zimbabwe was the most powerful states in the sub-region with regard to military and 
diplomatic influence of the Frontline States prior to South Africa’s admittance in SADC.  
This caused a split in the SADC over who should speak for the SADC.  According to 
Mugabe, South Africa would not truly represent African interest as opposed to ‘Western’ 
i.e., white interests”.127  The elevated status of Mandela ensured that South Africa would 
become a key player in SADC, Mugabe, however, opposed since he considered himself 
the elder statesmen or, at least, the longest-serving one in the sub-region.  Because of this 
Mugabe thought he could more rightfully speak for Southern Africa. 
As for the Angolans, the intervention in the DRC was motivated by purely self-
regarding interest including concerns of national security.  The Angolan government, 
which had supported Mobutu’s overthrow, was concerned about the involvement of 
Mobutist generals, soldiers and politicians in the rebellion against Kabila.  The Angolan 
government also recognized that a stable Congo would secure its borders against a 
growing UNITA insurgent threat emanating from Congolese bases.  Angola was also 
interested in increasing its chances of restoring the Benguela railway line, and gaining oil 
and diamond business.128 
The involvement of Angola also stemmed from the mining concessions negotiated 
with Kabila, who wanted to ensure continuing support from Angola.  Initially, the 
Angolan president, Dos Santos, announced that he was not prepared for a full scale war 
against UNITA because of the lack of funds to sustain such an operation.  The president 
made an arrangement with the Rwandan government in August 1998, but all that changed 
as soon as the offer from Kabila was put on the table.  The depressed oil prices and tight 
credit lines restricted the development of offshore oilfields, meaning that Angola had 
limited funds for any war.129   
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As for Namibian involvement in the DRC, the element of collective interest was 
the strong influencing factor.  The main reason for Namibia being interested in the Congo 
was its concern that UNITA forces were using DRC territory to wage war against 
Angola, causing substantial instability in the more heavily-populated northern areas of 
Namibia.  Thus, Namibia supported the Angolan government in its effort to root out 
UNITA forces from their bases.  Another reason was the contribution that the Namibian 
government wanted to make in the SADC as a new member state after getting 
independence from South Africa in 1990.  Furthermore Namibia wanted to extend 
appreciation towards Zimbabwe and Angola for their support during the struggle for 
liberation in the 1980s. 
The personal friendship among Mugabe and Namibian President, Sam Nujoma 
and Angolan President, Dos Santos played a significant role in their decision to intervene 
in the DRC.  The friendship is witnessed when they arranged a meeting among 
themselves and excluded other members of SADC, thus took a decision to 
simultaneously intervene in the DRC 
Under the element of interest and its influence in the possibility of peacemaking 
intervention several factors became evident.  First, the disinterest of a hegemon in a 
conflict-ridden state has a potential of luring other states in the sub-region that have much 
more stakes to lose.  Such intervention eliminates the peacemaking element which is 
expected by the international community.  Thus, in the nutshell, intervention can take 
place in the sub-region without support from the hegemonic state, but it does not become 
the expected peacemaking intervention, which is desired by both the sub-regional 
organization and the international community.  Obviously, when states other than the 
hegemon intervene they are driven by protecting their parochial interest combined with 
personal endeavors because of their limited resources and difficulty maintaining support 
from within the domestic arena.  The realist hypothesis stressing the importance of a 
hegemon’s power and interest in sub-regional peacemaking is evidently crucial towards 




D. WAS THERE A MANDATE? 
 
The conflict in the DRC highlighted the crisis inherent in African peace initiatives 
at the international, regional, sub-regional and local levels.  On the international level, it 
became clear that the international community was not prepared to get physically 
involved in the African conflicts.  This is particularly important because the genocide in 
Rwanda, which was left unchecked by the international community, resulted in the public 
opinion that the UN and other major international actors would no longer opt to stand 
aside if such an event took place in Africa.  Nevertheless, when the crisis in the DRC 
became known, the international community decided that it was time for Africans to deal 
with their continent’s conflicts and to find African solutions.  Important to add is that the 
Somalia event of 1993 was still fresh on the minds of many western powers.  Thus, not 
surprising the international community implicitly supported Uganda, Rwanda and Angola 
in assisting Kabila to overthrow Mobutu, who was seen as a ruthless dictator who had 
outlived his utility as the main actor in Central Africa.  The encouragement was basically 
associated with the notion that Africa’s new breed of leaders are now realizing that they 
must act decisively against any leader who is deemed to be destructive to the future of the 
continent.  Nevertheless, when the second round of intervention took place in the DRC, 
the UN strongly condemned the actions of all the states that intervened while particularly 
encouraging South Africa to condemn their actions as well.  
On the regional level, the OAU was not prepared to handle a crisis of this 
magnitude because of its structural weakness combined with its shortfall of resources 
needed to support this type of initiative in the DRC.  Even the newly formed AU, created 
last year in South Africa, remains financially strapped, with 10 of the 53 member 
countries facing sanctions for not paying their dues.  Another aspect was that the OAU 
was not prepared to alter its original position of only dealing with interstate rather than 
intrastate conflicts, which their conflict resolution mechanism was not designed for.  The 
OAU opted not to comment on the situation in the DRC because so many African states 
had already violated their principal rule of non-intervention in other member state’s 
domestic issues. 
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The position of the OAU/AU has created a vacuum that has to be filled by the 
sub-regional organizations in dealing with the conflicts in their respective regions.  
Unfortunately, the assumed responsibilities by sub-regional organizations also create 
their own problems.  The main problem relates to the absence of a sub-regional 
organization in the other sub-regions of the African continent.  As such, Central Africa, 
where the DRC is located, has no recognized organization, such as ECOWAS or SADC.  
The absence of such an organization creates a dilemma for any state in the sub-region 
when it seeks assistance from other states because of the blocked mandate to interfere in 
other’s domestic issues.  Since the beginning of the 1990s, only the sub-regional 
organizations have clearly been authorized to approve a mandate to respond to a request 
from the leaders of conflict-ridden states.  However, the position of the DRC is a bit 
complicated because, even though is located in Central Africa, it has been accepted as a 
member of the SADC since 1997 when it pledged to uphold democracy. What this 
ultimately means is that the only immediate organization entitled to allocate a mandate to 
intervene in the DRC conflict was the SADC.  This leads to the question were the 
interventions that took place in the DRC authorized under the auspices of the SADC?    
When Kabila was faced with a weakening military situation, Kabila, unlike in the 
period prior to his presidency, appealed to the SADC to assist of fellow member states 
under internal conflict or, as he put it, external threat.  The exclusion of South Africa was 
surprising because all the presidents of other members states were invited accept for 
South Africa, the hegemon in the sub-region. Arguably Mugabe’s actions confirmed the 
reports that he took the DRC’s request as an opportunity to assert his leadership in the 
sub-region, which was vanishing and being replaced by Nelson Mandela’s leadership in 
South Africa.  However, not much came out of the summit; perhaps Mugabe was using it 
as a testing ground for his authority. 
On August 12, 1997 the SADC Inter-State Defense and Security Committee 
(ISDSC) held its monthly meeting in Lusaka, but Angola, Zimbabwe, DRC, Lesotho, 
Seychelles and Mauritius failed to send delegates.130  This was a ploy by the three states, 
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except Lesotho and Seychelles to avoid the issue of DRC to be discussed.  The absence 
of so many states led to putting aside the Congo issue. 
Nevertheless, the following week the defense ministers of Angola, Zambia, 
Namibia and Zimbabwe met in Harare to agree that the Kabila’s government would fully 
get support of the SADC to ensure its survival.  Mugabe, who was then the chair of 
SADC, announced on behalf of the organization that it was unanimously agreed that 
military aid should be sent to secure Kabila’s position.  At the same time, the South 
African government denied such an agreement was made and continues to support for 
negotiations.  This circumstance created a rift in the SADC particularly between Mugabe 
and Mandela, which resulted in a war of words.  Nonetheless, Zimbabwe, Angola and 
Namibia dispatched troops to DRC to help Kabila’s government. 
On one level, Angola, Namibia and Zimbabwe’s decision to intervene was a 
clear-cut response to Kabila’s request for assistance in the face of Rwandan and Ugandan 
occupation of the eastern portion of his country.  From an international legal standpoint, 
the response was legitimate, but the mandate from SADC is questionable because of 
Mugabe’s actions of not including South Africa in the process.  Nevertheless, the request 
was made through the regional institutional framework of the SADC, of which the DRC 
is a member, but SADC as an organization did not officially approved the intervention.  
A collective security charter states that members will come to the assistance of any other 
member in the event of an invasion. 
However, the justifications the three troop-contributing countries offered for their 
actions were unfounded.  They initially explained that their intervention had been based 
on an organizational decision.  The sub-regional organization, however, was not 
operational and not involved in the peace negotiations.  Mugabe as the chair of SADC 
attempted to take a decision on the organ’s behalf, whereas, the other two states claimed 
that the ISDSC decision authorized their intervention. Nonetheless, the ISDSC did not 
have a mandate to make decisions.  Even if the ISDSC was mandated to take decision, 
there were only four states present at the August 1998 meeting from which they claimed 
the authority derived.131    
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The fabricated legitimacy of the intervention in the DRC was also reinforced by a 
complete turn-around by the South African government in September 1998 at a SADC 
mini-summit in Durban. At this summit, the government announced that the intervention 
had a SADC mandate and was reasonable because the DRC had been invaded132, 
however the change of heart by South Africa is not a guarantee of mandate from SADC, 
simply because South Africa is not SADC.  This explains two things about South Africa 
with regard to the response to DRC request.  First, as a hegemon in the sub-region, South 
Africa avoided declaring peacemaking intervention in the DRC because of its fear of 
being expected to contribute a significant portion of its resources as opposed to other 
states.  This was particularly true since it was Mandela who insisted that DRC become a 
SADC member.  The military of South Africa was still through the process of integrating 
and thus it was not prepared to deploy.  Second, South Africa might have anticipated the 
instability brooding in Lesotho and knew that it may have to intervene militarily at some 
stage, hence the turnaround on the issue of the DRC.  However, the divisions within the 
SADC, and Mugabe’s isolation of South Africa and using his leadership role to form an 
alliance to intervene in the DRC exemplify the absence of a sub-regional organization in 
Central Africa as well as the struggle for the right to be the voice of SADC and the 
influence in the regions of central and southern Africa.  Probably, Mugabe knew that 
South Africa’s position in the sub-region as a hegemon might threaten his intentions in 
the DRC and acted as one himself before it was too late. 
The justification for SADC involvement in the crisis of the DRC was complicated 
by the divisions that ensued between South Africa and the states on the side of 
Zimbabwe’s justification, which Zimbabwe lacked the hegemonic capacity to smooth 
over.  The South Africa’s lack of interest, which was clearly a hegemon in the sub-region, 
encouraged other states to rush in and protect their interest in the DRC.  The SADC organ 
despite the South African turn-around maneuver to support Mugabe’s claims did not 
mandate the intervention in DRC.  Thus, the globalist hypothesis based on the element of 
international law was not given any consideration because of the position a sub-regional 
organization found itself in. 
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As for the regional organization, the OAU did not even try to comment on the 
interventions in the DRC, because it was not sure of its position regarding actions from 
several of its member states.  On the international level, the UN firstly implicitly 
supported the interventions of overthrowing Mobutu, but later condemned the actions of 
all the states that intervened when Kabila was in power. 
E. MORAL DILEMMA 
 
The situation in the Great Lakes region has long been dominated by brutal killings 
and fighting within the member states territories, which have a tendency to spillover in 
the domestic realm of other neighbors.  The conflict situation in Burundi, Rwanda, DRC, 
Uganda and Congo-Brazzaville as well as other surrounding states like Angola and 
Tanzania is dominated by ethnic rivalry between the Tutsi and Hutu communities that are 
located in most all the states in the sub-region.  In the genocide committed in Rwanda in 
1994, more than a million civilians were massacred ruthlessly by the Hutu rebels because 
of their ethnic background.  This carnage demonstrated to the international community 
and the African organizations the lethality of the conflicts in this sub-region, which also 
result in a huge flow of refugees to scatter allover the sub-region.  The refugee problem 
increased but it also the tendency of having young men and boys being used to sustain the 
rebel force either voluntarily or coercively. 
Despite the 1994 genocide in Rwanda and the less well publicized carnage in 
Burundi, the record clearly demonstrated that the regional body (OAU) and some 
governments were not eager to become involved in the central African region.  An 
exception is those governments of countries who saw their security threatened by rebel 
groupings challenging their political positions.  The main concern of all the states that 
intervened in the DRC was the fear of rebel formations in their territory challenging their 
political positions and their personal interests.  These interests overrode the moral 
concern of humanitarian issues, such as refugees, starvation and murder taking place in 
the sub-region.  These elements of international morality were ignored by all the states 
involved when intervening.  Clearly, the SADC did not have procedures that focused 
either the short-term or long-term solution to humanitarian disasters even though such 
goals are rhetorically referred to in the SADC charter. 
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Since 1996, about 700.000 refugees are dispersed all over the sub-region with 
Tanzania absorbing a huge chunk of the figure.  About 400.000 refugees are 
“‘unaccounted for.”133  This is an amazing figure particularly after the 1997 overthrow of 
Mobutu who was seen as an instigator of the instability in the sub-region and the 
welcome leadership changes in states like Rwanda, Uganda, and DRC and to some extent 
Burundi as a breath of fresh-air blowing in the Great Lakes region. 
What was deliberately ignored by those who decided to intervene in the DRC was 
the report from Amnesty International in the wake of Kabila’s victorious march to 
Kinshasa in 1997 that “there is a mounting evidence that the AFDL has carried out a 
deliberate campaign of arbitrary killings and attacks of refuges who have refused or been 
too afraid to go back to Rwanda…particularly males of fighting age.”134  The UN High 
Commissioner for Human Rights reported that the rebels and AFDL were responsible for 
“serious violations of the right to life” and called for punishment against those 
responsible.135  This indicates is that some of the unaccounted refuges were slaughtered 
because of Kabila’s action of barring a further independent investigation by the UN about 
the missing refugees. 
The issue of humanitarian concern and the refugee problem was never mentioned 
by the states that intervened in the DRC as the factors that led to their decision to 
intervene militarily.  The primary concerns of most states that intervened in the DRC 
were a mixture of national security concerns and personal interests.  In the case of 
Zimbabwe and Namibia the fear of refugees spilling over in their state would have been a 
moot point because of their distance in relation to the DRC location.  In summary, the 
element of morality was never featured as a factor that prompted all the states to 
intervene in the DRC, even rhetorically.  Thus a globalist hypothesis drawn from the 
morality element that sub-regional peacemaking intervention is likely with a 
humanitarian carnage proved not to be the issue of the DRC conflict, but motivated by 
parochial and self-regarding interests.  
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F.  CONCLUSION 
 
The involvement of various states in the DRC conflict, mainly influenced by 
parochial national self-regarding and personal interests, overshadowed any claim of 
conducting peacemaking intervention.  The absence of a clear-cut hegemon in the Central 
African region encouraged numerous states to intervene in the sub-region, claiming to act 
on behalf of a democratically elected government of Kabila and SADC interests of 
stability and peace.  Also, the initial support from the international community when 
Kabila outset Mobutu from power set in motion the precedent that intervention in DRC is 
acceptable as long as it can be justified by a claim of some sort.  Judging from the events 
in the case study, the realist hypothesis that sub-regional peacemaking intervention is 
more likely when a hegemonic power is economically formidable with its position being 
acknowledged by other states in the region, whether explicitly or implicitly, is 
transformed.  What this signifies is that the absence of a clear-cut hegemon in the sub-
region, meaning that intervention can take place in the sub-region even if a hegemon is 
not interested. 
However, this transformation is not radical since clearly states that decided to 
intervene in the DRC calculated their position in relation to their opponents.  A second 
realist hypothesis that sub-regional peacemaking is more likely when the interests of the 
hegemon are at stake seems to hold because South Africa refrained from involvement.  In 
the absence of a sub-regional organization and a hegemonic state in the Central African 
sub-region any intervention became a pure form of military intervention. 
Kabila’s request for assistance from SADC was legal according to its treaty, but 
the response highlighted the deep division among the member states in the sub-region.  
At that time South Africa was a newly member of SADC and its position was challenged 
by Zimbabwean government because of their stakes in the DRC.  The other point is that 
South Africa as a hegemon was not fully interested in sending its military to the DRC 
which in itself explain the position of DRC outside the proper sub-region were South 
Africa is deemed to be dominant.  The initial objection of South Africa to Mogabe’s 
claim that the intervention in the DRC was granted by SADC and that a sudden change of 
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heart still does not grant a mandate from SADC to the interventions in the DRC.  As for 
the globalists’ hypothesis that sub-regional peacemaking is more likely when the sub-
regional organizations assess the conflict as transcending sovereignty claims and leads to 
unacceptable humanitarian sufferings, which cannot be sustained because of SADC 
divisions on the crisis in DRC. As for the other globalist’s hypothesis, there was no 
indication from SADC in the case of the crisis in the DRC that intervention was caused 
by the concern of humanitarian carnage.  In conclusion, it is clearly that an element of 
personal interest and self-regarding interest played an enormous role in the interventions 
in DRC crisis. 
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V. SOUTHERN AFRICAN PEACEMAKING MILITARY 




This chapter will discuss the Southern African Development Community (SADC) 
peacemaking military intervention in Lesotho in relation to the position of South Africa 
as a sub-regional hegemon.  The aim is to determine whether this operation was 
mandated by SADC or it was solely a result of South Africa’s concern with either its 
position in the sub-region or its parochial interests in Lesotho.  This chapter starts by 
briefly tracing the origin of SADC, the aim being to explain how South Africa came to be 
a member state.  The rest of the chapter will discuss events from the origin of the conflict 
in Lesotho following the theoretical framework outlined in Chapter II. 
In 1980, nine states in Southern Africa formed the Southern African Development 
Co-ordination Conference (SADCC).  The nine founding members were Angola, 
Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia, and 
Zimbabwe.  The membership eventually grew to ten with the inclusion of Namibia in 
1990 after its independence from the then white dominated South African regime.  The 
primary aim of the SADCC was to establish economic viability by increasing cooperation 
among member states.  This was particularly directed to some extent to the South African 
white regime, which dominated the sub-region economically, thus fostering dependence 
of other states on its capability.136 
SADCC was basically a loose cooperative framework rather than a formal sub-
regional entity, as there was no treaty establishing the organization or governing the 
activities of its members.  However, in July 1981, a Memorandum of Understanding on 
the institutions of SADCC was completed.137  The absence of official institutions 
automatically meant that each member state was responsible for a particular aspect of 
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SADCC’s program.138  The rationale underlying this informal arrangement was that it did 
not encroach upon member states’ sovereignty and thus endeavored to facilitate 
cooperation among countries with different ideologies and development priorities.139  
The shortcoming of SADCC was that its original intention of reducing economic 
dependence on South Africa failed dismally because of its unstructured and informal 
operations.  Nevertheless, the organization managed to build solidarity among its 
members and also mobilized significant international donor support for its project.140  
However, Pretoria continued exerts a powerful economic grip in the sub-region.  The 
SADCC report of 1985 stated that contrary to expectations countries in the sub-region 
were more reliant upon South Africa as a trading partner more than before the 
organization was formed.141 
As a result of the failures of the SADCC, the Council of Ministers met in January 
1992 and approved a proposal to transform the organization into a fully integrated 
economic community, known as the SADC.142  Subsequently, South Africa was 
welcomed as a member in 1994 after the first democratically elected regime was 
established and was followed by Mauritius in August 1995, as well as the DRC and 
Seychelles in September 1997. 
Although the creation of the SADC was primarily for economic cooperation and 
independence, “peace and security concerns were nevertheless evident.”143  This can be 
seen in the declaration by heads of states when addressing the issue of establishing a 
formal security structure: 
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Good and strengthened political relations among the countries of the 
region, and peace and mutual security, are critical components of the total 
environment for regional cooperation and integration.  The region needs, 
therefore, to establish a framework and mechanisms to strengthen regional 
solidarity, and provide for mutual peace and security.144 
Also article 4 of the SADC treaty identifies “solidarity, peace and security” as one 
of the principles that should the guide the actions of SADC members.145  Several conflict 
resolution mechanisms were also established such as the Organ for Politics, Defense and 
Security and Inter State Defense Security Council (ISDSC), but were never fully 
developed and equipped to deal with intrastate conflict in the sub-region.  The 
effectiveness of these institutions will be the focus when assessing the SADC 
peacemaking military intervention in Lesotho. 
B. BRIEF BACKGROUND ON THE CONFLICT AND DECISION TO 
INTERVENE 
 
Lesotho is a one of the smaller countries in Africa, completely surrounded by 
South Africa in all of its borders.  It has a population of about ….Due to Lesotho’s 
proximity to South Africa, it was always too vulnerable politically and economically to 
criticize apartheid government overtly.146  Lesotho played a major role during the 
struggle against apartheid, for example, harboring South African exiles, most of whom 
received higher education and military training there.  The country is also economically 
dependent on South Africa.  A substantial percentage of the Basotho form South African 
workforce and both countries use the same monetary system. In addition, Sesotho, which 
is the language of Lesotho, is one of the major and official languages of South Africa, 
and the people in both countries have families on either side of the border.147  In a 
rhetorical expression, Lesotho can be viewed to be part of South Africa even though it 
has been granted sovereign independence by the international community.   
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The conflict in Lesotho was the result of domestic political disagreements about 
the outcome of elections.  This problem can be traced from 1994 when the countries from 
SADC undertook diplomatic efforts to resolve crisis in Lesotho.  Apparently the SADC 
initiatives were drawn by the tension between the then democratically-elected Prime 
Minister, Ntsu Mokhehle and the Kingdom’s monarch, King Letsie III, which had been 
steadily rising since 1993.  In January 1994, Botswana, South Africa and Zimbabwe 
formed a task force to find a peaceful solution to the dispute.148  By then South Africa 
was not an official member of the SADC but was included as part of the mediation 
team.149  However, despite their efforts the situation was not resolved, because a royal 
coup was attempted by Mokhehle which was strongly condemned by SADC.  This nearly 
resulted in military intervention, but intervention was stopped by the deadline date of 
September 2, 1994 when Mokhehle and Letsie agreed to restore the monarchy.   
The pace of proposed intervention in Lesotho was slow because of the SADC 
contemplation of the cost and resources needed to mount such operations and that South 
Africa played along with SADC’s suggestion because it was not yet an official member 
state.  Going alone to secure its parochial interest would have destroyed its chances to 
become a member because would then be viewed by other member states as not being 
different to the white apartheid regime which forcefully dominated the frontline states for 
a long period.  The speed and duration of mediation changed when South Africa 
intervened in Lesotho in 1998.  This will be an indication of the hegemon’s ability to 
launch peacemaking intervention irrespective of sub-regional organization assistance 
except for a needed authorization which was obtained after the action has been taken. 
The 1994 solutions were, short-lived and in 1998 a conflict ensued in Lesotho 
primarily from the dissatisfaction of the political opposition parties who demanded that 
King Letsie III use his powers to dissolve the Parliament, since they believed that its 
members had been unfairly elected.150  The protest led some members of Lesotho 
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Defense Force (LDF) to seize arms and ammunition and expel or imprison their 
commanding officers.151 Government vehicles were hijacked, the broadcasting station 
was closed, the Prime Minister and other Ministers were virtually held hostage and the 
Lesotho police lost control of the situation.152   
On August 21, SADC established a committee of experts to investigate the 
allegations of electoral fraud in an attempt to quell the growing crisis.  Fearing a further 
breakdown of law and order, Prime Minister Mosisili, who replaced Mokhehle as the 
leader of the ruling Liberal Congress for Democracy party (LDC), requested SADC 
assistance153 in the form a peacemaking military intervention in support of the 
government.  Apparently, this request was came in response to actions by junior military 
officers, who placed the Prime Minister under house arrest and effectively removed 
senior military officers thought to be loyal to the ruling LDC.   
On September 22, 1998, South African troops crossed into Lesotho in the early 
morning hours, followed later by troops from Botswana.  The intervention resulted in the 
deployment of South African troops for a period of six months.  It was followed by the 
withdrawal in 1999 after the government of LDC was restored to power, on conditions 
that a new election would be held within eighteen months, which was scheduled for April 
2000.154  This effort emanated from a joint force established between Botswana and 
South Africa in preparation for a possible military operation.155   The reason why South 
Africa launched the intervention alone will be discussed in relation the hegemonic role it 
played in the sub-region. 
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C. SOUTH AFRICAN HEGEMONIC ROLE AND THE DECISION TO 
INTERVENE 
 
The South African hegemonic role in the peacemaking intervention in Lesotho 
became evident when it instructed the SADC to establish a committee of experts to 
investigate the allegations of election fraud professed by the political opposition party 
against the LCD.  The Langa Commission was established by the SADC, but it was 
chaired by South Africa and dominated by South Africans.156  It was reported that the 
commission did find some irregularities in the counting process in the election but 
decided not to nullify the elections157 on the instruction of the South African government.  
There are two possible reasons as to why South African government took this action.  
Firstly, South Africa did not want to set a precedent in the sub-region for other groups in 
other states to oppose democratic elections hoping they would be nullified upon their 
request to the SADC, because in that case South Africa have to shoulder the cost of 
future intervention because of its hegemonic status. .  In addition, South Africa was also 
just beyond their first democratically elected government and the feared that if it allowed 
such action to prevail South Africa might have to deal with a similar problem in the 
future.  Secondly, South African government realized that the conflict in Lesotho was an 
opportune moment to establish its hegemonic role because of the affordability of the 
operation due to factors such as proximity and resources as compared to conflicts such as 
the DRC, Angola and Burundi.  South Africa’s position in the previous conflicts was 
criticized by the international community as well as fellow African states as being 
reluctant to exercise its legitimate right as a formidable hegemon.  The excuses of being 
busy with integration and transformation of its armed forces were becoming monotonous 
and out-dated, and something needed to be done to uphold South Africa’s prestige in the 
international system. 
The other strong indicator of South African hegemony is how the request from 
Lesotho was processed.  The Lesotho Prime Minister opted to route his request for 
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assistance through South Africa instead of the SADC organ mechanisms.  These actions 
from the Lesotho leader indicate at least two factors that reinforce the hegemonic power 
of South Africa in the sub-region.  Firstly, the leader of the Lesotho realized that his 
request can only become practical only through a hegemon’s influence in the SADC and 
also that it made sense to ask help from South Africa because of the proximity element, 
which ultimately leads to the other factor.  Secondly, Lesotho leader was not interested in 
inviting SADC as an organ but only the South African state, which is one reason why 
South Africa went ahead without a mandate from SADC. 
The decision to launch peacemaking intervention in Lesotho alone before 
Botswana force joined with them was suspect because they had prior trained jointly a 
training exercise in preparation for a possible military operation.  Even though it was said 
to be a combined task force, consisting of the South African National Defense Force 
(SANDF) and Botswana Defense Force (BDF), “it was before nightfall on September 22 
that approximately 200 Batswana troops arrived in Maseru.”158  This action by South 
Africa can be attributed to both its ability as a hegemon in the sub-region and its desire to 
show it could contribute effectively to the seeking of peace and stability in the African 
continent.  On the issue of hegemonic ability, a solitary intervention in Lesotho proved 
that South Africa did not need any assistance from fellow SADC member states, but 
welcomed their presence.  On the issue of prestige, the solo action also was to prove that 
South Africa was ready to contribute effectively and speedily in dire situations that 
require its support. 
The realist hypothesis that peacemaking intervention in the sub-region is likely 
when a hegemon’s power and economic position is acknowledged by other states in the 
region became a reality in the crisis of Lesotho.  The request procedure opted by 
Lesotho’s Prime Minister was an illegitimate action but nevertheless was an indication 
that this leader acknowledged and accepted South African’s leadership in the sub-region.  
There was no indication of other states in the sub-region opposing the action taken by 
South Africa in Lesotho.  Also by the time the Botswana convoy arrived they surely must 
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have been relived that the situation was taken care-off by South Africa, because of the 
poor equipment they had when arriving in Lesotho. 
D. THE ROLE OF INTEREST IN THE DECISION TO INTERVENE 
 
When the political transformation took place in South Africa during 1994, one of 
the issues that were placed high on the political agenda was water.159  In Lesotho, South 
Africa has invested in a huge project of dam building that supports the major industrial 
areas in the Gauteng Province, which is an economic hub of the state.  Also the water 
from the Lesotho Highlands Water Project, which consists of a number of dams already 
build, such as Katse and Mogale dams, is used to support the population in the upper 
parts of the Highveld region.  No wonder, therefore, that the peacemaking intervention 
launched by South African troops under the auspices of SADC is associated in South 
African with efforts to protect certain of its national interests such as the water scheme 
project. 
Another consideration associated with interests is the argument that the Lesotho 
government had been democratically elected despite certain irregularities during the 
election process, and it was increasingly required of South Africa to play a role in 
regional peacemaking efforts, which serve two important tasks for South Africa.  The 
first is that South Africa, as a newly established democracy itself, should show its support 
for democratically elected governments so as to avoid small election irregularities 
becoming a route for ambitious elements in the military forces in the sub-region to pursue 
their political aspiration, particularly since South African armed forces are still in an 
infancy stage of getting integrated.  The second task reflected in South Africa’s policy 
was a commitment to development in the region.160         
Clearly in this case self-regarding interest became a great motivator for the 
decision to intervene in the Lesotho crisis.  What seems to add support for this 
observation is that this was the first peacemaking operation in which South Africa had to 
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prove its dominance in the sub-region, because if it opted for other measures as in the 
case of Burundi and DRC, the message could have been clear that it was not as strong as 
was anticipated by the outside world.  The realist hypothesis that peacemaking 
intervention is more likely when the interests of the hegemon are at stake fits the Lesotho 
case well. 
In the case of personal interest, there was no indication of direct personal 
relationship between Mandela and Mosisili.  The point of this argument is based on the 
recent establishment of a South African democratic government, which was only four 
years old.  It could not have afforded Mandela enough opportunity to already build a 
close relationship with either of the leaders in the sub-region.  Second, even the water 
was not an enough justification on its own to have motivated South Africa’s intervention 
in Lesotho, all other arguments such as maintenance of democracy and the fear of the 
conflict spilling over the borders affecting parts of South Africa, still constitutes elements 
of self-regarding interests on the part of South Africa. 
Surely South Africa has a collective interest in the sub-region because of its 
political and economic dependence on the stability of the sub-region.  Any instability in 
the sub-region will jeopardize South Africa’s economic success as well as other member 
states.  Thus, it was imperative that South Africa be prepared to offer any kind of 
assistance to maintain harmony in the sub-region.  The benefit of peace and stability in 
the sub-region not only enhance the SADC states directly, but more towards South 
African position.  However, collective interest was not enough to have caused the 
intervention in Lesotho, particularly at the speed and magnitude carried by the South 
African government. 
E. QUESTION OF MANDATE 
 
The decision to initiate peacemaking intervention in Lesotho was made without 
explicit SADC authorization.  Accordingly, it becomes hard to imagine how South 
African intervention in Lesotho, which resembled a military invasion and occupation of 
the Kingdom of Lesotho, could have followed a SADC mandate for peacemaking.161  In 
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fact, a requested mandate was granted but only after the intervention took place.  Also at 
the very same time, South African government had been against the intervention of 
Zimbabwe, Angola and Namibia in the DRC, and reported that the decision taken by 
Mugabe and his colleagues was not on behalf of the SADC.  A statement made by the 
late Parks Mankahlana, who was Mandela’s spokesperson, said directly, “there is no way 
that the people who met at Victoria Falls and Harare can have met under the auspices of 
the SADC.”162  The sudden change of heart by the South African government on the 
intervention in the DRC, and leading it to declare that for the three states hade intervened 
on behalf of the SADC shows that it was busy paving way for the invasion of Lesotho.  
However, the South African government maintained that the military intervention did not 
constitute an invasion163 while the SANDF maintained that there was not only a proper 
SADC mandate, but also a moral obligation on South Africa and Botswana to intervene 
in Lesotho.164  Furthermore the South African Minister of Safety and Security reportedly 
confirmed that SADC had authorized a possible military intervention in the event of a 
coup in Lesotho,165 which was vehemently denied by SADC structures.  At the SADC 
summit in Grand Baie the week before the intervention, SADC Heads of State had 
merely “expressed concern at the civil disturbances and loss of life following the recent 
elections” and welcomed the mediation initiatives led by the South African 
government,166 not approving peacemaking intervention as reported by South African 
officials. 
Another argument presented as a legal mandate was based on the request sent by 
Prime Minister Pakalitha Mosisili.  It is stated that the decision was based on and justified 
by the fact that the SADC had been directly approached by the leader of Lesotho.167  
Although Mosisili was a head of government, the request did not contain the approval of 
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King Letsie who was a nominal head of State, as required by the constitution.168   
Apparently, the request also was not sent directly to SADC organs but was sent at various 
states such as Botswana, Mozambique, South Africa and Zimbabwe, but only Botswana 
and South Africa were practically able to respond.  In the case of South Africa it 
managed to edge out Botswana because its resources and manpower enabled it to move in 
fast, especially given its closer proximity as compared to Botswana. 
The mandate from the SADC was obtained afterwards by the South Africans, 
which indicates that a sub-regional organization is only effective when a hegemon wants 
to utilize it for its own purposes, whether before the operation or afterwards.  The SADC 
approved the actions of South Africa in Lesotho without even questioning their actions of 
ignoring the mechanisms setup by the sub-regional organization.  The OAU and the UN 
opted to let the “sleeping dogs lie”, because no comments were attributed to them in 
relation to the intervention in Lesotho. 
The globalist hypothesis that peacemaking intervention is likely when a sub-
regional organization believes the conflict in a particular state transcends sovereignty 
claims and is leading to unacceptable humanitarian sufferings was proven not be the case 
in the Lesotho crisis.  South Africa did not bother to consult the SADC regarding its 
intentions in Lesotho. 
F. QUESTION OF MORALITY 
 
The moral justification was raised neither by the SADC organization nor South 
African government in influencing the decision to intervene militarily in Lesotho conflict.   
It is however mentioned in passing by some official documents of South Africa.  Perhaps, 
South Africa worried about the number of the refugees it could have been absorbed by 
them in case the conflict escalated to the worst stage.  This would not have been 
surprising because Lesotho is surrounded by the boundaries of South Africa.  In fact 
South Africa provides employment to the bulk of Lesotho’s citizens in both its industrial 
and agricultural sectors. 
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It is also reported that the conflict in Lesotho resulted in a number of deaths 
accompanied by destruction of property and looting.  The moral issues such a huge flow 
of refugees, human rights abuses, killings and genocide were not reported by the public 
media, which was largely allowed to cover the entire combined operation in Lesotho, 
known as Operation Boelas.  In this case, there is no indication of the element of morality 
having contributed to the South African decision to intervene in Lesotho. 
G. CONCLUSION 
 
It is clear from this case study that a peacemaking intervention in Lesotho was 
initiated and conducted primarily by a sub-regional hegemon in its sub-region.  It was the 
South African government that received a request from Lesotho; it was South Africa that 
initiated the possibility of mounting peacemaking intervention in Lesotho; it was South 
African troops that single-handedly intervened in without a proper mandate from the 
SADC.  Clearly this was the case where the realist hypotheses of power and intersts 
dominated as opposed to globalist perspective.  The impetus for South African 
intervention in Lesotho arose from threats to national security and other interests 
propelled by the ability to launch such an operation because of the command of resources 
that are otherwise not possessed by the SADC as a sub-regional organization.  This case 
has made it clear that if a sub-regional hegemon’s interest is threatened it will not seek a 
mandate before it mounts intervention in a conflict-ridden state and will only request it 
after the fact.  This indicated that even if the hegemon is capable to launch peacemaking 
intervention in the sub-region with a prior or proper mandate form the sub-regional 
organization, it still imperative that such organization give the approval for any action 




A. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE CASES AND THEIR FUTURE 
IMPACT ON THE CONTINENT 
 
1. Introduction 
It is clear from the case studies that African societies are in crisis.  The crisis 
involves grave problems of human survival and a scramble for resources by those who 
wield power.  According to many observers, crisis in Africa has become a state of 
existence.169  Others even maintain that the crisis in Africa is so extensive that it 
threatens to dissolve the glue that somehow still holds various societies together. 
Since the beginning of the 1990s there has been a growing inclination of the 
African state to intervene militarily in the domestic affairs of neighboring and far-off 
countries.  Whether states intervene individually or regionally, leaders tend to justify their 
actions with varied arguments, ranging from a need to ensure stability or to alleviate 
suffering to a need to restore democracy, while avoiding any language that indicates self-
regarding interest.  However, the successful launching of peacemaking intervention 
seems to depend on the ability and the willingness of hegemonic states in the sub-region 
to voluntarily commit resources.  Decisions to intervene depend on a number of factors, 
such as power relations within the sub-region, the kinds of interests involved, the issue of 
international law and the depth of moral obligation possessed by the hegemonic state. 
2. Power Relations 
The element of power plays a significant part in the decision of a hegemon to 
launch peacemaking military intervention.  Power involves the possession of formidable 
economic and military resources by a sub-regional hegemon, resources which are 
explicitly acknowledged by other member states.  In addition, the resources possessed by 
the hegemon must be able to influence other states in the sub-region and its role must be 
accepted as coming from an acknowledged leader of the sub-region.  What was similar in 
the case of Nigeria and South Africa, but different for those states that intervened in the 
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Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), particularly Zimbabwe, was the ability of the sub-
regional hegemons to use their resources effectively to attract other states to side with 
their proposals. 
In the West African case, Nigeria as a hegemon possessed all the required 
resources, which made it possible to undertake peacemaking intervention in Liberia. 
However, since its leadership was not totally acknowledged by all the member states in 
the sub-region, the challenge for Nigeria was to devise a means of ensuring its dominance 
over the other states without creating fear from being perceived as a coercive hegemonic 
power.   The cost that Nigeria incurred from the operation indicated that no state in the 
sub-region would have been able to sustain such costs.  The possession of the resources 
enabled Nigeria to pursue its intended objectives by luring other smaller states in the sub-
region, like Togo and Gambia.  Nigeria was able to attract support from these states 
because it indicated its willingness to shoulder the costs for the operation including those  
that might be incurred by other states.  The willingness of Nigeria to contribute almost 
ninety percent of the manpower and equipment indicated its hegemonic capability to 
other states. 
The opposition of Cote d’Ivoire and Burkina Faso to ECOMOG revealed how a 
Liberian war could have easily polarized ECOWAS states and spoiled the larger 
objectives of sub-regional integration.  The disagreement over the Liberian operation 
was, in fact, a manifestation of fundamental problems.  The primary problem was fear of 
Nigeria’s hegemonic dominance by other states, particularly the Francophone countries 
that always suspected Nigeria’s zeal for dominance in the sub-region.  Nevertheless, 
Nigeria’s overwhelming power and possession of resources enabled it to transcend such 
opposition from Cote d’Ivoire and Burkina Faso.  Nigeria’s ability to proceed with its 
intentions even with opposition from other states in the sub-region indicates that a 
hegemon with formidable resources can easily pursue its objectives regardless of 
obtaining consensus from other states.  Thus, peacemaking intervention has a high 
likelihood of taking place provided the state, which is a hegemon, is able to utilize its 
resources and spread its influence over other states in the sub-region.   
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In Central Africa, the unwillingness of the hegemon, South Africa, to intervene in 
the DRC allowed the other states to jump on the opportunity to pursue their parochial 
interest.  The willingness of a sub-regional hegemon to take a lead in launching 
peacemaking intervention enables it to curtail divergent parochial interests from smaller 
states in the sub-region because it is able to provide a clear overall aim of intervening in 
the conflict ridden state.  In addition, other states in the sub-region are expected to pursue 
parochial interests because they do not have a lot of resources to utilize as compared to 
those possessed by the hegemon.  Thus, for whatever reason their decision to intervene 
will be limited to the immediate self-regarding interest. 
Zimbabwe’s decision to isolate South Africa on the issue of the DRC did not help 
Zimbabwe much because Zimbabwe was not able to co-opt a significant number of states 
from the SADC to go along with its intentions ambition.  The reason why Zimbabwe was 
not able to co-opt other states was its inability to act as a natural hegemon like Nigeria.  
Unlike Nigeria, which gained support from other states by providing for their necessities, 
Zimbabwe does not have enough resources to distribute. 
The unwillingness of South Africa to play its natural role in the DRC is attributed 
to the development of a complicated situation in the DRC.  As a hegemon, South Africa 
should have realized that a peacemaking mission in the DRC was going to be dominated 
by the other states’ pursuit of their parochial interests.  South Africa should have realized 
it was being isolated when it was not invited to the SADC meeting organized by Mugabe.  
Although South Africa objected to the declaration of the interventions in the DRC as 
mandated by the SADC, it did not act in a manner expected of hegemon; for example it 
immediately should have used its power to form a coalition with other member states in 
the sub-region in order to rectify the situation in the DRC.  In West Africa, Nigeria acted 
differently when it realized that the support of Taylor by Cote d’Ivoire and Burkina Faso 
was going to cause damage to its intentions in the sub-region.  It immediately proposed 
an SMC structure so as to set up an ECOMOG force to undermine the support of the 
other two states. 
In Southern Africa, the size of South African economic and political dominance 
in the SADC as compared to other states meant it had few problems in its decision to 
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intervene in Lesotho.  In this case South Africa indicated that a hegemonic state of its 
magnitude does not require any assistance from other member states to launch 
peacemaking intervention.  Also in this case, South Africa did not experience the 
Nigerian situation where the other states refused to acknowledge its position as a 
hegemon.  The SADC member states readily accept the leadership of the South African 
state by welcoming its effort to bring peace and stability in the sub-region because they 
realized that being on the side of the hegemon benefited every state in the sub-region.  
This is unlike the situation in ECOWAS where the francophone states still rely on France 
to provide for their needs with grants and extensive loans.  The non-reliance of other 
states on the economic interdependence in the sub-region creates a problem for a 
hegemonic state to establish its dominance because the hegemon gives little justification 
to other states when attempting to pursue its objectives. 
The proposals for peacemaking intervention brought to the forefront the political 
divisions that dominated power relations in the various sub-regions of the continent.  The 
cause of political divisions varied, ranging from the colonial past, historical animosity 
and the fear of weakening occupied power positions.  In West Africa, divisions arose 
played between the Anglophone and Francophone states.  What actually aligned the 
division to the colonial past was the difference between Nigeria, which is Anglophone, 
and Cote d’Ivoire and Burkina Faso,which were Francophone, on how to handle the 
Liberian debacle.  In this case, Nigeria emerged to play a significant role in molding the 
differences in ECOWAS towards achieving peace in Liberia.  Though some self-
regarding interests were involved, these were merged with greater sub-regional interests 
in the course of the transformation process from an economic to a political/security 
organization.  The Liberian crisis seems to have made member states transcend their 
national interests by building their common security regime, by developing norms and by 
practically maintaining them. 
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However, the Liberian experience provided a path breaking approach under 
Nigeria’s hegemonic leadership.  Nigeria was able to use its hegemonic influence to 
mobilize a small group of support from some member states of the ECOWAS to achieve 
set objectives, which would ultimately benefit the entire sub-region.  In the Liberian 
crisis, the SMC member states provided the support needed by Nigeria to demonstrate her 
hegemonic influence.  This was neither a splinter action nor a coercive hegemonic 
approach but an effective organizing of collective action under a “sway diplomacy” 
exhibited by Nigerian epistemic leadership.170   
In Central Africa, the divisions were mainly attributed to an attempt of other 
states to deliberately isolate a hegemonic state because they realized that in order to 
pursue their parochial interests they should avoid the power of the hegemon.  Mugabe’s 
decision not to extend an invitation to the newly accepted hegemon, South Africa, was 
based on the knowledge that South Africa would thwart his intentions of proposing 
intervention in the DRC.  Nevertheless, the disinterest of South Africa in getting involved 
in the DRC helped to sustain Zimbabwe’s ambitions.  What happened in the DRC is 
absolutely attributed to the South African government’s reluctance to exercise its 
hegemonic role.  This is an indication that whenever a state regarded as a natural 
hegemon neglects its duty of keeping the sub-region stable and peaceful, the other 
smaller states may react by protecting their interest and plundering resources from the 
conflict state to support their intervention efforts. 
3. Interest 
The element of interest plays a prominent role influenced decisions by hegemons 
to launch peacemaking intervention in their respective sub-regions.  In all the case 
studies, collective interest has been cited by others was the main motivation for the 
hegemon’s decision to perform peacemaking intervention in the sub-region. While it is 
true that sub-regional hegemons stand to benefit from having stability and peace in the 
sub-region because of the size of their socioeconomic sectors, the case studies strongly 
indicate that self-regarding interest is really the main motivating factor. 
In its decision to intervene in Liberia, Nigeria attempted to cast its involvement in 
Liberia in moral terms but its primary intention was self-regarding in character.  The self-
regarding interest stems from Nigeria’s ambition to apply its hegemonic influence in the 
sub-region.  Nigeria cited humanitarian carnage as its main motive for peacemaking 
military intervention.  Nigerian President, Ibrahim Babangida, defended the Liberian 
operation with the following statement, which he thought was crucial to justifying 
intervention:                                                  
170 Yoroms and Aning, p 56 
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 We are in Liberia because events in that country have led to the massive 
destruction of property and the massacre of thousands of innocent 
civilians.  Should Nigeria and other responsible countries in the sub-region 
stand by and watch the whole of Liberia turned into one mass graveyard?  
There are those who are waiting to see the Liberian crisis as a concrete 
indicator of Africa in disarray and despair, purposeless and without 
direction or control.  In Liberia we are first and foremost reflecting the 
love we have for our respective countries, our sub-region, Africa, the 
black world and mankind.171 
 
Despite the morality language used by the Nigerian president, self-regarding 
interest was still a decisive determinant in launching peacemaking military intervention.  
The impact of the Liberian crisis on the Nigerian state was not as severe as on other states 
such as Cote d’Ivoire and Sierra Leone because of their proximity.  What served as an 
indication of Nigeria’s pursuit of self-regarding interest was the zealous manner in which 
it pushed the necessity of intervention in Liberia as opposed to other states that actually 
felt the impact of the conflict in Liberia.  Nigeria did this simply to protect its position 
within the sub-region from being directly threatened.  Thus, self-regarding interest 
remains a factor in motivating hegemons to launch peacemaking intervention.     
In the south, self-regarding interest was also the main influencing factor in the 
decision of South Africa to intervene in Lesotho.  The amount of resources invested by 
South Africa in Lesotho and the speed in which the intervention in Lesotho was 
undertaken, when compared with the conflicts of the DRC and Burundi, shows how 
important Lesotho was to South Africa. 
In justifying the intervention in Lesotho, the South African government 
emphasized the fact that it was increasingly being required to play a role in regional 
peacekeeping. This role required South Africa to confront the military faction in Lesotho, 
threatening a democratically elected government; therefore South Africa’s aim was to 
intervene with the mandate of intervening in the name of the SADC to restore stability in 
Lesotho.  The fact that for the first time the newly elected democratic government had 
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deployed armed forces on foreign soil explains the importance of Lesotho to South 
Africa.  Most importantly the intervention in Lesotho was highly aligned to the element 
of self-regarding interest. 
In the case of the DRC, the three SADC states that intervened under the 
leadership of Zimbabwe cited the articles of the SADC, the OAU and the UN that spell 
out the principle of non-interference in the domestic matters of other member states 
without proper authorization, as the primary reason that influenced their decisions to 
intervene.  The evidence from the case study revealed on the contrary that self-regarding 
and personal interests were the factors that pushed the interventions in the DRC.  
The interventions in the DRC and Liberia reveal the difference between 
hegemons and smaller states when considering the kinds of interests in peacemaking 
intervention.  A sub-regional hegemon, such as Nigeria, has both self-regarding and 
collective interest as motivating factors to launch peacemaking intervention in the sub-
region.  In contrast, smaller states are overwhelmingly influenced by the protection of 
personal and self-regarding interests for participating in the peacemaking intervention.  
Surely, the differences of resource ownership contribute to these kinds of influence.  The 
smaller states only have a limited resource capacity to sustain them in a single objective 
while a hegemon is able to pursue multiple objectives and, at the same time, use its 
resources to influence other member states to join in the effort of peacemaking. 
On the other hand, as in the case of South Africa’s intervention in Lesotho, a sub-
regional hegemon is able to launch peacemaking intervention on its own without a need 
for support from other states.  The securing of support from other states can be used to 
grant legitimacy to the intervention itself.  South Africa managed to influence Botswana 
to go along with the decision to intervene in Lesotho, but did not bother to wait for its 
arrival before the actual operation. 
The personal interest of leaders also played a significant role in the case studies, 
particularly from the Nigeria intervention in Liberia and the interventions in the DRC.  In 
the case of Nigeria, Babangida’s friendship with Doe was extensively cited as the main 
cause of Nigeria’s enthusiasm for becoming involved in Liberia. Although enough 
evidence exists to establish the depth of the friendship between the two, the Nigerian 
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President was clearly using Doe’s friendship to pursue the Nigerian strategy of 
entrenching hegemonic influence in the region.  After realizing that the two francophone 
states, Cote d’Ivoire and Burkina Faso, had opted to support Taylor in his efforts to take 
over Liberia and that the whole thing was pushed by a personal grudge, it was reasonable 
for Nigeria to opt to support Doe because of his position.  Doe was a legitimate leader of 
Liberia who was recognized by the international community; therefore, Nigeria knew that 
supporting him was going to legitimize and justify their intentions.  This calculated 
strategy managed to get other smaller states on the side of Nigeria while enabling it to 
pursue its objective with minimum hindrance. 
In the DRC, of personal interest was most important in Zimbabwe’s role in the 
intervention.  The connection arose from the ownership of shares in the mining industry 
in the DRC by most of Mugabe’s military leadership and senior government officials.  
Also the involvement was said to have been stimulated by the debt that Kabila owed to 
Zimbabwe after it assisted him in ousting Mobutu from power.  The Zimbabwean 
government recognized that if Kabila could lose his position, the money owed to them 
would also disappear.  Thus, the sensible path was to help sustain Kabila in power.  
However, a limitation in achieving this objective was that Zimbabwe did not posses 
enough ability to sway matters in its favor due to its lack of hegemonic status and 
capability in the sub-region.  In its attempted isolation of South Africa, Zimbabwe used a 
calculated strategy of avoiding any hindrances while at the same time gaining legitimacy 
for the intervention. 
4. Mandates and Justification 
The issue of mandates from the sub-regional organizations to authorize the 
peacemaking interventions was also conducted differently in the three case studies.  The 
importance of mandates in West Africa differed significantly from the manner in which it 
was handled in Central and Southern Africa.  The way sub-regional organizations were 
approached was also different in all the case studies.  However, the common factor 
among the interveners of is an attempt to seek proper mandate from sub-regional 
organizations either before or after intervening. 
In the case of West Africa, Nigeria as a hegemon continually attempted to seek a 
proper mandate from ECOWAS on its intentions of intervening in Liberia.  Nigeria was 
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aware that its position of leadership was not deeply entrenched or accepted by all the 
states in the sub-region.  It was also aware of the historical divisions between the 
Anglophone and Francophone states in the sub-region.  The most sensible approach from 
Nigeria was to pursue its objectives through the ECOWAS as a sub-regional body.  This 
was not only going to grant a proper legitimacy to their claims to be acting for peace and 
stability in the sub-region, but it was also going to influence other states to follow suit 
and accept its leadership without much difficulty. 
In the case of the interventions in the DRC, there was manipulation of the 
SADC’s process to enable the interventions of Zimbabwe, Angola and Namibia to be 
seen as having a SADC mandate.  The Zimbabwean President, Mugabe, deliberately 
isolated South Africa from the SADC meetings that discussed the issue of the DRC.  By 
that time Mugabe was the chairperson of SADC, and he thought that his position was 
enough to influence the decisions of other member states to support intervention in the 
DRC.  However, Mugabe knew that only by utilizing a proper mechanism of SADC and 
the full participation of all member states could a proper mandate from SADC be 
facilitated.  Mugabe never wanted to have a proper mandate from SADC because he 
knew that such action would jeopardize his objectives.  By painting the intervention as 
being mandated by the SADC, as a temporary measure he facilitated his intentions 
without violating the clause from the UN, the OAU and the SADC, which stipulates non-
interference on domestic matters of other states.  The three SADC states that intervened 
in the DRC also justified their actions as being a counteraction from those states that 
invaded the DRC territory. 
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In the South, South Africa intervened in Lesotho without seeking a mandate from 
the SADC.  This case indicates that when the hegemon’s immediate interests are 
threatened by the conflict within and other state a mandate from a sub-regional 
organization seems not to matter since it can be obtained after the factThese case studies 
illustrate both the dilemma of classifying and of justifying military interventions.  In the 
first case study, several members of ECOWAS, under Nigeria, intervened in Liberia for 
apparently humanitarian reasons and undermined their own weak economies but 
stabilized the brutal conflicts in West Africa.  In the second case study, several Central 
African states with totally different motives intervened in power struggles in the DRC, 
put nearly unbearable pressures on their own economies and settled for a ceasefire that 
held the promise of peaceful developments.  In the third case study, South Africa, 
supported by Botswana, suppressed a coup attempt in Lesotho and agreed on future 
democratic elections. 
The African justification of intervening is reinforced by a growing international 
emphasis on the interdependent of societies and states.  In an increasingly 
interdependence world, the division between what is defined as “domestic” affairs and 
what is defined as affairs “external” to a state is often a very thin one.  The growing 
emphasis on globalization at the beginning of the twenty first century has 
internationalized the internal affairs of states even more.  The review of international law 
implies that the important principles that guided international relations, such as 
sovereignty and non-interference, have been revised.  The guidelines for peacemaking 
military intervention become exceptionally complicated when applied from these three 
diverse case studies to other African conflicts in general. 
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The September 19, 2002, crisis, which blew up Cote d’Ivoire after a failed coup, 
is one indication of how the sub-regional organization intends to deal with crisis in its 
sub-region.  On December 24, 2002, ECOWAS announced the deployment of about 
1,264 troops, but delayed the arrival of the first soldiers to January 03, 2003.  In this case, 
Nigeria as a hegemon in the sub-region has two options to deal with the conflict in Cote 
d’Ivoire.  The first option is to utilize this opportunity to entrench its hegemony by 
intervening at a large scale in Cote d’Ivoire and by convincing other states to become part 
of ECOMOG.  The second option for Nigeria is to let the situation in Cote d’Ivoire 
deteriorate to the stage where the capacity of the state is no longer on a par with what it 
was beforehand.  The goal of this option is based on the position of Cote d’Ivoire in 
relation to Nigeria’s hegemony.  Cote d’Ivoire is one of the major states that objected to 
Nigeria’s decision to launch peacemaking intervention in Liberia and supported the 
Charles Taylor group.  However, the SMC body established by Nigeria to deal with any 
future conflicts in the sub-region was not the main body that approved the decision to 
send troops to Cote d’Ivoire.  This is a clear indication that the formation of the SMC was 
a strategy of Nigeria to launch the ECOMOG force in Liberia under the pretext of 
ECOWAS and was not for the reasons attributed to it before. 
The conflict in Burundi saw an extensive involvement of South Africa with a 
deployment of 700 troops to monitor the democratic transition in that country.  This kind 
of action from South Africa can be attributed to realizing its role as a hegemon in the 
region.  The handling of the situation in the DRC resulted in a complicated situation 
because of South Africa’s negligence of its natural role as a hegemon in the region. 
Nevertheless, the tentative acceptance of some forms of interventions is still valid 
only in terms of international law.  Peacemaking intervention missions conducted within 
an international legal framework and perceived as legitimate are likely to be supported by 
more states.172  Legitimacy is heightened when peacemaking intervention is planned 
under the auspices of sub-regional organizations, such as ECOWAS and the SADC.  
Likewise, legitimacy is virtually always questioned when sub-regional security structures 
endorse the military intervention of individual states only after it has started.  An example 
is when the intervention of South African armed forces was Lesotho is labeled, as sub-
regional SADC venture only after a series of telephone calls had been made between 
some heads of state.173 
The legitimacy furthermore demands authorization by the UN.  In terms of article 
53 in the Charter of the UN, “no enforcement action shall be taken under regional 
arrangement or by regional agencies without the authorization of the Security 
Council.”174  However, although the interventions in the DRC and Lesotho took place 
without explicit and prior UN authorization, the UN seems not to be prepared to accept 
the responsibility of regional and sub-regional organizations for maintaining security.  
Because the correlated principles of sovereignty and non-intervention form the basis of 
contemporary international relations, peacemaking military intervention always requires 
justification.  Of importance is that the government under attack must specifically request 
military intervention from the potential intervener. 
At the level of intra-regional diplomacy, the divisions within the sub-regional 
organizations revealed how the conflicts could easily polarize states and derail the larger 
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objectives of regional integration.  The fact that the organizations provide a regular forum 
for summit diplomacy, permitting leaders to negotiate their differences directly, made it 
possible to get other states to support peace plans.  However, it is incumbent upon the 
sub-regional hegemon to lure other states in following the path that will ensure peace and 
stability in the sub-region.    
The sub-regional organizations’ procedures for handling internal conflicts proved 
completely inadequate for the political and security decisions that were required for all 
the crises.  Clearly, there was a need to improve the decision-making apparatus.  The 
institutions of the sub-organizations had to be strengthened and revitalized if they were to 
serve the vehicles to bridge divisions and promote regional integration. 
The fact that Nigeria orchestrated the formation of ECOMOG demonstrates the 
sub-regional hegemonic powers can use their influences in a sub-regional organization to 
build national coalitions in support of their particularistic objectives.  The United States, 
a global hegemon, did that with the UN in Korea in 1950 and in the Gulf War in 1991.  
Geopolitically, Africa has two power centers, Nigeria and South Africa.  The two power 
centers could become growth poles for the development of the African economy.  A 
logical outcome of this would be the development of Nigeria and South Africa to enhance 
their interest and capability in continental defense and security.  Only then, would the 
conflicts in the African continent be approached with resilience and be solved for the 
larger benefit of continental development. 
5. Morality 
It is clear from the case studies that morality was used to hide the real intentions 
behind the decisions to intervene in the conflict states.  Nigeria indicated the 
humanitarian carnage as their prime motivator to intervene because of the flow of 
refugees into other states; however, other states who experienced a large impact than 
Nigeria disagreed with its reason. 
Since morality falls within the realm of sub-regional organizations, the hegemons 
and other ambitious states like Zimbabwe, as well as the suspecting ones like Ivory Coast 
feel not obligated to moral influence.  However, all the states discovered that morality is 
a perfect instrument to garner support of other states in their sub-regions.  Thus as a result 
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they tended to use moral degradation as the main factor influenced their decision to 
peacemaking intervention. 
The situation in the DRC, there was some moral justification attributed by states 
to intervene, while it was clear that self-regarding interests was the primary motivating 
factor of intervention.  The absence of South Africa as a hegemon in the DRC allowed 
the development of self-interest to be the prime reason used by other states to intervene, 
because only a hegemon possesses enough interest to cast morality as a reason to 
intervene. 
In conclusion, the international community should support the sub-regional 
organizations with the proper resources needed to launch peacemaking interventions in 
Africa, so as to counter the sub-regional hegemon’s tendency to neglect their 
organization mandates.  Although the call by Africans to deal with their own problems in 
their own manner is an acceptable proposal, the need for resources still remain important 
and need to be contributed by those states in the northern hemisphere.  A historical 
observation is that any conflict developing in any part of the world has a potential to 
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